E-privacy in 2nd generation E-commerce: privacy preferences versus actual behavior
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Why Information Security is Hard-An Economic Perspective
ACSAC '01 Proceedings of the 17th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Near rationality and competitive equilibria in networked systems
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Practice and theory of incentives in networked systems
Privacy and Rationality in Individual Decision Making
IEEE Security and Privacy
Secure or insure?: a game-theoretic analysis of information security games
Proceedings of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web
Uncertainty in the weakest-link security game
GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
Network security games: combining game theory, behavioral economics, and network measurements
GameSec'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security
How many attackers can selfish defenders catch?
Discrete Applied Mathematics
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
We aim to advance the understanding of individual security decision-making, by combining formal and behavioral analysis. We sketch a game-theoretic model of security decision-making that generalizes the "weakest link" game, and describe a controlled laboratory experiment to reveal differences between predicted and observed user behavior. Results of a pilot study yield possible explanations for behaviors observed in the wild: users show some willingness to experiment with parameters, rarely converge to a fixed behavior, and face difficulties isolating the impact of individual parameters.