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Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking - Special issue on computer network security
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Using information security as a response to competitor analysis systems
Communications of the ACM
Sustaining Availability of Web Services under Distributed Denial of Service Attacks
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Statistical Identification of Encrypted Web Browsing Traffic
SP '02 Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Proceedings of the tenth ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining
Incentive-based modeling and inference of attacker intent, objectives, and strategies
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Distributed privacy preserving information sharing
VLDB '05 Proceedings of the 31st international conference on Very large data bases
Tracking anonymous peer-to-peer VoIP calls on the internet
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
An effective defense against email spam laundering
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Inferring the source of encrypted HTTP connections
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A Bayesian game approach for intrusion detection in wireless ad hoc networks
GameNets '06 Proceeding from the 2006 workshop on Game theory for communications and networks
Timing analysis of keystrokes and timing attacks on SSH
SSYM'01 Proceedings of the 10th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 10
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Game Theoretic Analysis of Cooperation Stimulation and Security in Autonomous Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
DSSS-Based Flow Marking Technique for Invisible Traceback
SP '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Security and Cooperation in Wireless Networks: Thwarting Malicious and Selfish Behavior in the Age of Ubiquitous Computing
A new cell counter based attack against tor
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Maintaining defender's reputation in anomaly detection against insider attacks
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics - Special issue on game theory
Preventing active timing attacks in low-latency anonymous communication
PETS'10 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Impact of network topology on anonymity and overhead in low-latency anonymity networks
PETS'10 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
On flow correlation attacks and countermeasures in mix networks
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Game theory meets network security and privacy
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
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In this paper, we address the problem of defending against entry-exit linking attacks in Tor, a popular anonymous communication system. We formalize the problem as a repeated non-cooperative game between the defender and the adversary (i.e., controller of the compromised Tor nodes to carry out entry-exit linking attacks). Given the current path selection algorithm of Tor, we derive an optimal attack strategy for the adversary according to its utility function, followed by an optimal defensive strategy against this attack. We then repeat such interactions for three additional times, leading to three design principles, namely stratified path selection, bandwidth order selection, and adaptive exit selection. We further develop gPath, a path selection algorithm that integrates all three principles to significantly reduce the success probability of linking attacks. Using a combination of theoretical analysis and experimental studies on real-world Tor data, we demonstrate the superiority of our algorithm over the existing ones.