Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
SNDSS '96 Proceedings of the 1996 Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security (SNDSS '96)
Statistical Identification of Encrypted Web Browsing Traffic
SP '02 Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
IP covert timing channels: design and detection
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Fingerprinting Relational Databases: Schemes and Specialties
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
On Flow Marking Attacks in Wireless Anonymous Communication Networks
ICDCS '05 Proceedings of the 25th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Tracking anonymous peer-to-peer VoIP calls on the internet
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
On the Secrecy of Timing-Based Active Watermarking Trace-Back Techniques
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Hot or not: revealing hidden services by their clock skew
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
DSSS-Based Flow Marking Technique for Invisible Traceback
SP '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Network Flow Watermarking Attack on Low-Latency Anonymous Communication Systems
SP '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
USENIX-SS'06 Proceedings of the 15th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 15
Low-resource routing attacks against tor
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Covert channels in privacy-preserving identification systems
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Multi-flow attacks against network flow watermarking schemes
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
A practical congestion attack on tor using long paths
SSYM'09 Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
On flow correlation attacks and countermeasures in mix networks
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
gPath: a game-theoretic path selection algorithm to protect Tor's anonymity
GameSec'10 Proceedings of the First international conference on Decision and game theory for security
Effective digital forensics research is investigator-centric
HotSec'11 Proceedings of the 6th USENIX conference on Hot topics in security
Rendezvous tunnel for anonymous publishing: clean slate and tor based designs
SSS'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Stabilization, safety, and security of distributed systems
"Super nodes" in Tor: existence and security implication
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Malice versus AN.ON: possible risks of missing replay and integrity protection
FC'11 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
ARDEN: Anonymous networking in delay tolerant networks
Ad Hoc Networks
Unidentifiable Attacks in Electric Power Systems
ICCPS '12 Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE/ACM Third International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems
SGor: Trust graph based onion routing
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
How to block Tor's hidden bridges: detecting methods and countermeasures
The Journal of Supercomputing
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Various low-latency anonymous communication systems such as Tor and Anoymizer have been designed to provide anonymity service for users. In order to hide the communication of users, many anonymity systems pack the application data into equal-sized cells (e.g., 512 bytes for Tor, a known real-world, circuit-based low-latency anonymous communication network). In this paper, we investigate a new cell counter based attack against Tor, which allows the attacker to confirm anonymous communication relationship among users very quickly. In this attack, by marginally varying the counter of cells in the target traffic at the malicious exit onion router, the attacker can embed a secret signal into the variation of cell counter of the target traffic. The embedded signal will be carried along with the target traffic and arrive at the malicious entry onion router. Then an accomplice of the attacker at the malicious entry onion router will detect the embedded signal based on the received cells and confirm the communication relationship among users. We have implemented this attack against Tor and our experimental data validate its feasibility and effectiveness. There are several unique features of this attack. First, this attack is highly efficient and can confirm very short communication sessions with only tens of cells. Second, this attack is effective and its detection rate approaches 100% with a very low false positive rate. Third, it is possible to implement the attack in a way that appears to be very difficult for honest participants to detect (e.g. using our hopping-based signal embedding).