Hot or not: revealing hidden services by their clock skew
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Pseudonym-based cryptography for anonymous communications in mobile ad hoc networks
International Journal of Security and Networks
Survey on anonymity in unstructured peer-to-peer systems
Journal of Computer Science and Technology
Privacy-aware routing in sensor networks
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
A new cell counter based attack against tor
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A performance analysis of authentication using covert timing channels
NETWORKING'08 Proceedings of the 7th international IFIP-TC6 networking conference on AdHoc and sensor networks, wireless networks, next generation internet
A potential HTTP-based application-level attack against Tor
Future Generation Computer Systems
"Super nodes" in Tor: existence and security implication
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
An interval centroid based spread spectrum watermarking scheme for multi-flow traceback
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
A new cell-counting-based attack against Tor
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Protocol-level attacks against Tor
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
A novel sequential watermark detection model for efficient traceback of secret network attack flows
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
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This paper studies the degradation of anonymity in a flow-based wireless mix network under flow marking attacks, in which an adversary embeds a recognizable pattern of marks into wireless traffic flows by electromagnetic interference. We find that traditional mix technologies are not effective in defeating flow marking attacks, and it may take an adversary only a few seconds to recognize the communication relationship between hosts by tracking suchartificial marks. Flow marking attacks utilize frequency domain analytical techniques and convert time domain marks into invariant feature frequencies. To counter flow marking attacks, we propose a new countermeasure based on digital filtering technology, and show that this filter-based counter-measure can effectively defend a wireless mix network from flow marking attacks.