Elements of information theory
Elements of information theory
Statistical Identification of Encrypted Web Browsing Traffic
SP '02 Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
On Flow Marking Attacks in Wireless Anonymous Communication Networks
ICDCS '05 Proceedings of the 25th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Tracking anonymous peer-to-peer VoIP calls on the internet
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
On the Secrecy of Timing-Based Active Watermarking Trace-Back Techniques
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Hot or not: revealing hidden services by their clock skew
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Inferring the source of encrypted HTTP connections
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Timing analysis of keystrokes and timing attacks on SSH
SSYM'01 Proceedings of the 10th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 10
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
DSSS-Based Flow Marking Technique for Invisible Traceback
SP '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Network Flow Watermarking Attack on Low-Latency Anonymous Communication Systems
SP '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Low-resource routing attacks against tor
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Language identification of encrypted VoIP traffic: Alejandra y Roberto or Alice and Bob?
SS'07 Proceedings of 16th USENIX Security Symposium on USENIX Security Symposium
Spot Me if You Can: Uncovering Spoken Phrases in Encrypted VoIP Conversations
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Shining Light in Dark Places: Understanding the Tor Network
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Multi-flow attacks against network flow watermarking schemes
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
A practical congestion attack on tor using long paths
SSYM'09 Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
Slotted packet counting attacks on anonymity protocols
AISC '09 Proceedings of the Seventh Australasian Conference on Information Security - Volume 98
Cyber Crime Scene Investigations (C2SI) through Cloud Computing
ICDCSW '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 30th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops
On flow correlation attacks and countermeasures in mix networks
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Timing analysis in low-latency mix networks: attacks and defenses
ESORICS'06 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Research in Computer Security
On channel capacity per unit cost
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
SGor: Trust graph based onion routing
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
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Various low-latency anonymous communication systems such as Tor and Anonymizer have been designed to provide anonymity service for users. In order to hide the communication of users, most of the anonymity systems pack the application data into equal-sized cells (e.g., 512 B for Tor, a known real-world, circuit-based, low-latency anonymous communication network). Via extensive experiments on Tor, we found that the size of IP packets in the Tor network can be very dynamic because a cell is an application concept and the IP layer may repack cells. Based on this finding, we investigate a new cell-counting-based attack against Tor, which allows the attacker to confirm anonymous communication relationship among users very quickly. In this attack, by marginally varying the number of cells in the target traffic at the malicious exit onion router, the attacker can embed a secret signal into the variation of cell counter of the target traffic. The embedded signal will be carried along with the target traffic and arrive at the malicious entry onion router. Then, an accomplice of the attacker at themalicious entry onion router will detect the embedded signal based on the received cells and confirm the communication relationship among users. We have implemented this attack against Tor, and our experimental data validate its feasibility and effectiveness. There are several unique features of this attack. First, this attack is highly efficient and can confirm very short communication sessions with only tens of cells. Second, this attack is effective, and its detection rate approaches 100% with a very low false positive rate. Third, it is possible to implement the attack in a way that appears to be very difficult for honest participants to detect (e.g., using our hopping-based signal embedding).