CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Communications of the ACM
A note on the confinement problem
Communications of the ACM
ISDN-MIXes: Untraceable Communication with Small Bandwidth Overhead
Kommunikation in Verteilten Systemen, Grundlagen, Anwendungen, Betrieb, GI/ITG-Fachtagung
Lattice Scheduling and Covert Channels
SP '92 Proceedings of the 1992 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Estimation and Removal of Clock Skew from Network Delay Measurements
Estimation and Removal of Clock Skew from Network Delay Measurements
A pseudonymous communications infrastructure for the internet
A pseudonymous communications infrastructure for the internet
A Multi-Layered Approach to Security in High Assurance Systems
HICSS '04 Proceedings of the Proceedings of the 37th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS'04) - Track 9 - Volume 9
Covert channels and anonymizing networks
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Remote Physical Device Fingerprinting
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
On Flow Marking Attacks in Wireless Anonymous Communication Networks
ICDCS '05 Proceedings of the 25th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Using client puzzles to protect TLS
SSYM'01 Proceedings of the 10th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 10
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Anonymity and covert channels in simple timed mix-firewalls
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Embedding covert channels into TCP/IP
IH'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information Hiding
Anonymous connections and onion routing
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Low-resource routing attacks against tor
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
How much anonymity does network latency leak?
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Passive-Logging Attacks Against Anonymous Communications Systems
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Identifying unique devices through wireless fingerprinting
WiSec '08 Proceedings of the first ACM conference on Wireless network security
User centricity: A taxonomy and open issues
Journal of Computer Security - The Second ACM Workshop on Digital Identity Management - DIM 2006
On fast and accurate detection of unauthorized wireless access points using clock skews
Proceedings of the 14th ACM international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Shining Light in Dark Places: Understanding the Tor Network
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Quantifying Resistance to the Sybil Attack
Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Information leaks in structured peer-to-peer anonymous communication systems
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Protecting privacy with protocol stack virtualization
Proceedings of the 7th ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
An improved clock-skew measurement technique for revealing hidden services
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
Disappearing Cryptography: Information Hiding: Steganography & Watermarking
Disappearing Cryptography: Information Hiding: Steganography & Watermarking
Scalable Link-Based Relay Selection for Anonymous Routing
PETS '09 Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Physical Layer Attacks on Unlinkability in Wireless LANs
PETS '09 Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
A new cell counter based attack against tor
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Hashing it out in public: common failure modes of DHT-based anonymity schemes
Proceedings of the 8th ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
How much anonymity does network latency leak?
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Improving efficiency and simplicity of Tor circuit establishment and hidden services
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Covert channels through external interference
WOOT'09 Proceedings of the 3rd USENIX conference on Offensive technologies
A potential HTTP-based application-level attack against Tor
Future Generation Computer Systems
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Anonymity and monitoring: how to monitor the infrastructure of an anonymity system
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part C: Applications and Reviews
How unique is your web browser?
PETS'10 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Traffic analysis against low-latency anonymity networks using available bandwidth estimation
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
Towards clock skew based services in wireless sensor networks
International Journal of Sensor Networks
Strengthening forensic investigations of child pornography on P2P networks
Proceedings of the 6th International COnference
Estimating the number of users behind ip addresses for combating abusive traffic
Proceedings of the 17th ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining
Effective digital forensics research is investigator-centric
HotSec'11 Proceedings of the 6th USENIX conference on Hot topics in security
Stealthy traffic analysis of low-latency anonymous communication using throughput fingerprinting
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
"Mix-in-Place" anonymous networking using secure function evaluation
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Information Leaks in Structured Peer-to-Peer Anonymous Communication Systems
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) - Special Issue on Computer and Communications Security
Tor HTTP usage and information leakage
CMS'10 Proceedings of the 11th IFIP TC 6/TC 11 international conference on Communications and Multimedia Security
Beyond TOR: the truenyms protocol
SIIS'11 Proceedings of the 2011 international conference on Security and Intelligent Information Systems
Leaving timing-channel fingerprints in hidden service log files
Digital Investigation: The International Journal of Digital Forensics & Incident Response
A new cell-counting-based attack against Tor
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
On physical-layer identification of wireless devices
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Effectiveness and detection of denial-of-service attacks in tor
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Probabilistic analysis of onion routing in a black-box model
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Protocol-level attacks against Tor
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
A defense against clock skew replication attacks in wireless sensor networks
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
How to block Tor's hidden bridges: detecting methods and countermeasures
The Journal of Supercomputing
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Location-hidden services, as offered by anonymity systems such as Tor, allow servers to be operated under a pseudonym. As Tor is an overlay network, servers hosting hidden services are accessible both directly and over the anonymous channel. Traffic patterns through one channel have observable effects on the other, thus allowing a service's pseudonymous identity and IP address to be linked. One proposed solution to this vulnerability is for Tor nodes to provide fixed quality of service to each connection, regardless of other traffic, thus reducing capacity but resisting such interference attacks. However, even if each connection does not influence the others, total throughput would still affect the load on the CPU, and thus its heat output. Unfortunately for anonymity, the result of temperature on clock skew can be remotely detected through observing timestamps. This attack works because existing abstract models of anonymity-network nodes do not take into account the inevitable imperfections of the hardware they run on. Furthermore, we suggest the same technique could be exploited as a classical covert channel and can even provide geolocation.