The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Project “anonymity and unobservability in the Internet”
Proceedings of the tenth conference on Computers, freedom and privacy: challenging the assumptions
Predicting web actions from HTML content
Proceedings of the thirteenth ACM conference on Hypertext and hypermedia
Tarzan: a peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Hordes: a multicast based protocol for anonymity
Journal of Computer Security
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Hiding
Limits of Anonymity in Open Environments
IH '02 Revised Papers from the 5th International Workshop on Information Hiding
Probabilistic Analysis of Anonymity
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Statistical Identification of Encrypted Web Browsing Traffic
SP '02 Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Defending Anonymous Communications Against Passive Logging Attacks
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Responder Anonymity and Anonymous Peer-to-Peer File Sharing
ICNP '01 Proceedings of the Ninth International Conference on Network Protocols
The predecessor attack: An analysis of a threat to anonymous communications systems
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Predictability of Web-Server Traffic Congestion
WCW '05 Proceedings of the 10th International Workshop on Web Content Caching and Distribution
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
P5: a protocol for scalable anonymous communication
Journal of Computer Security
Hot or not: revealing hidden services by their clock skew
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Inferring the source of encrypted HTTP connections
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
USITS'99 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on USENIX Symposium on Internet Technologies and Systems - Volume 2
Towards an information theoretic metric for anonymity
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Dummy traffic against long term intersection attacks
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Fingerprinting websites using traffic analysis
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Informant: detecting sybils using incentives
FC'07/USEC'07 Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Financial cryptography and 1st International conference on Usable Security
Practical traffic analysis: extending and resisting statistical disclosure
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
The traffic analysis of continuous-time mixes
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Privacy vulnerabilities in encrypted HTTP streams
PET'05 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Quantifying Resistance to the Sybil Attack
Financial Cryptography and Data Security
PEON: privacy-enhanced opportunistic networks with applications in assistive environments
Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on PErvasive Technologies Related to Assistive Environments
ShadowWalker: peer-to-peer anonymous communication using redundant structured topologies
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A potential HTTP-based application-level attack against Tor
Future Generation Computer Systems
Security and Communication Networks
Sensor node source privacy and packet recovery under eavesdropping and node compromise attacks
ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks (TOSN)
Hang with your buddies to resist intersection attacks
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
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Using analysis, simulation, and experimentation, we examine the threat against anonymous communications posed by passive-logging attacks. In previous work, we analyzed the success of such attacks under various assumptions. Here, we evaluate the effects of these assumptions more closely. First, we analyze the Onion Routing-based model used in prior work in which a fixed set of nodes remains in the system indefinitely. We show that for this model, by removing the assumption of uniformly random selection of nodes for placement in the path, initiators can greatly improve their anonymity. Second, we show by simulation that attack times are significantly lower in practice than bounds given by analytical results from prior work. Third, we analyze the effects of a dynamic membership model, in which nodes are allowed to join and leave the system; we show that all known defenses fail more quickly when the assumption of a static node set is relaxed. Fourth, intersection attacks against peer-to-peer systems are shown to be an additional danger, either on their own or in conjunction with the predecessor attack. Finally, we address the question of whether the regular communication patterns required by the attacks exist in real traffic. We collected and analyzed the Web requests of users to determine the extent to which basic patterns can be found. We show that, for our study, frequent and repeated communication to the same Web site is common.