Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Wireless integrated network sensors
Communications of the ACM
Defending Anonymous Communications Against Passive Logging Attacks
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Detailed models for sensor network simulations and their impact on network performance
MSWiM '04 Proceedings of the 7th ACM international symposium on Modeling, analysis and simulation of wireless and mobile systems
TinyPK: securing sensor networks with public key technology
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
TinySec: a link layer security architecture for wireless sensor networks
SenSys '04 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Embedded networked sensor systems
Enhancing Source-Location Privacy in Sensor Network Routing
ICDCS '05 Proceedings of the 25th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
CHEMAS: Identify suspect nodes in selective forwarding attacks
Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing
Passive-Logging Attacks Against Anonymous Communications Systems
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Towards event source unobservability with minimum network traffic in sensor networks
WiSec '08 Proceedings of the first ACM conference on Wireless network security
Source location privacy against laptop-class attacks in sensor networks
Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Security and privacy in communication netowrks
Location privacy and anonymity preserving routing for wireless sensor networks
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Privacy-aware routing in sensor networks
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Energy comparison of AES and SHA-1 for ubiquitous computing
EUC'06 Proceedings of the 2006 international conference on Emerging Directions in Embedded and Ubiquitous Computing
Efficient constructions for one-way hash chains
ACNS'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
A formal treatment of onion routing
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
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Securing a sensor network poses a variety of problems. Of those, an important one is of providing privacy to the event-detecting sensor node and integrity to the data gathered by the node. Compromised source privacy can inadvertently leak event location. Safeguarding the privacy of the source node is important, as sensor networks hold critical roles in military application, tracking endangered species, etc. Existing techniques in sensor networks use either random walk path or generate fake event packets to make it hard for an adversary to trace back to the source, since encryption alone may not help prevent a traffic analysis attack. In this work, without using traditional overhead-intensive methods, we present a scheme for hiding source information using cryptographic techniques incurring lower overhead. The packet is modified en route by dynamically selected nodes to make it difficult for a malicious entity to trace back the packet to a source node and also to prevent packet spoofing. This is important because the adversary model considers a super-local eavesdropper having the ability to compromise sensor nodes. Additionally, we provide a method for the base station to recover corrupted packets and identify the location of the compromised node. We analyze the ability of our proposed scheme to withstand different attacks and demonstrate its efficiency in terms of overhead and functionality when compared to existing work.