Data networks
The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
EUROCRYPT '89 Proceedings of the workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Randomized algorithms
Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Project “anonymity and unobservability in the Internet”
Proceedings of the tenth conference on Computers, freedom and privacy: challenging the assumptions
A protocol for anonymous communication over the Internet
Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Tarzan: a peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Introducing MorphMix: peer-to-peer based anonymous Internet usage with collusion detection
Proceedings of the 2002 ACM workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society
ISDN-MIXes: Untraceable Communication with Small Bandwidth Overhead
Kommunikation in Verteilten Systemen, Grundlagen, Anwendungen, Betrieb, GI/ITG-Fachtagung
Finding a Connection Chain for Tracing Intruders
ESORICS '00 Proceedings of the 6th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
Probabilistic Analysis of Anonymity
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
P5: A Protocol for Scalable Anonymous Communication
SP '02 Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Defending Anonymous Communications Against Passive Logging Attacks
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Responder Anonymity and Anonymous Peer-to-Peer File Sharing
ICNP '01 Proceedings of the Ninth International Conference on Network Protocols
Holding intruders accountable on the Internet
SP '95 Proceedings of the 1995 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Local anonymity in the internet
Local anonymity in the internet
Anonymous connections and onion routing
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Towards a framework for connection anonymity
SAICSIT '05 Proceedings of the 2005 annual research conference of the South African institute of computer scientists and information technologists on IT research in developing countries
Cashmere: resilient anonymous routing
NSDI'05 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Symposium on Networked Systems Design & Implementation - Volume 2
Probabilistic analysis of onion routing in a black-box model
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Passive-Logging Attacks Against Anonymous Communications Systems
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
A holistic anonymity framework for web services
Proceedings of the 1st international conference on PErvasive Technologies Related to Assistive Environments
Studying Timing Analysis on the Internet with SubRosa
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Bridging and Fingerprinting: Epistemic Attacks on Route Selection
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Quantifying Resistance to the Sybil Attack
Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Information leaks in structured peer-to-peer anonymous communication systems
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
BitBlender: light-weight anonymity for BitTorrent
Proceedings of the workshop on Applications of private and anonymous communications
The Power of Anonymous Veto in Public Discussion
Transactions on Computational Science IV
Survey on anonymity in unstructured peer-to-peer systems
Journal of Computer Science and Technology
PEON: privacy-enhanced opportunistic networks with applications in assistive environments
Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on PErvasive Technologies Related to Assistive Environments
On anonymity in an electronic society: A survey of anonymous communication systems
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Scalable Link-Based Relay Selection for Anonymous Routing
PETS '09 Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Hashing it out in public: common failure modes of DHT-based anonymity schemes
Proceedings of the 8th ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Survey on anonymous communications in computer networks
Computer Communications
Flexible and secure service discovery in ubiquitous computing
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
The wisdom of crowds: attacks and optimal constructions
ESORICS'09 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Research in computer security
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Anonymity and monitoring: how to monitor the infrastructure of an anonymity system
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part C: Applications and Reviews
Providing mobile users' anonymity in hybrid networks
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
Empirical tests of anonymous voice over IP
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
Relationships and data sanitization: a study in scarlet
Proceedings of the 2010 workshop on New security paradigms
AOS: an anonymous overlay system for mobile ad hoc networks
Wireless Networks
DefenestraTor: throwing out windows in Tor
PETS'11 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Anonymous Communication Over Invisible Mix Rings
ICA3PP'11 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Algorithms and architectures for parallel processing - Volume Part I
Breaking four mix-related schemes based on universal re-encryption
ISC'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Information Security
Information Leaks in Structured Peer-to-Peer Anonymous Communication Systems
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) - Special Issue on Computer and Communications Security
Valet services: improving hidden servers with a personal touch
PET'06 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Changing of the guards: a framework for understanding and improving entry guard selection in tor
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Probabilistic analysis of onion routing in a black-box model
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Security and Communication Networks
The dangers of composing anonymous channels
IH'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Information Hiding
Providing Users’ Anonymity in Mobile Hybrid Networks
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT)
Users get routed: traffic correlation on tor by realistic adversaries
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
On the limits of provable anonymity
Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society
SGor: Trust graph based onion routing
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
There have been a number of protocols proposed for anonymous network communication. In this paper, we investigate attacks by corrupt group members that degrade the anonymity of each protocol over time. We prove that when a particular initiator continues communication with a particular responder across path reformations, existing protocols are subject to the attack. We use this result to place an upper bound on how long existing protocols, including Crowds, Onion Routing, Hordes, Web Mixes, and DC-Net, can maintain anonymity in the face of the attacks described. This provides a basis for comparing these protocols against each other. Our results show that fully connected DC-Net is the most resilient to these attacks, but it suffers from scalability issues that keep anonymity group sizes small. We also show through simulation that the underlying topography of the DC-Net affects the resilience of the protocol: as the number of neighbors a node has increases the strength of the protocol increases, at the cost of higher communication overhead.