Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Tarzan: a peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
ESORICS '96 Proceedings of the 4th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Hiding
Limits of Anonymity in Open Environments
IH '02 Revised Papers from the 5th International Workshop on Information Hiding
The predecessor attack: An analysis of a threat to anonymous communications systems
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Anonymity and information hiding in multiagent systems
Journal of Computer Security
Measuring relationship anonymity in mix networks
Proceedings of the 5th ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Privacy-preserving sharing and correction of security alerts
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Probabilistic analysis of an anonymity system
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW15
Information hiding, anonymity and privacy: a modular approach
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on WITS'02
Towards an information theoretic metric for anonymity
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Statistical disclosure or intersection attacks on anonymity systems
IH'04 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information Hiding
Practical traffic analysis: extending and resisting statistical disclosure
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
A formal treatment of onion routing
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Anonymous connections and onion routing
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Bridging and Fingerprinting: Epistemic Attacks on Route Selection
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Quantifying maximal loss of anonymity in protocols
Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Information, Computer, and Communications Security
Low-latency Mix Using Split and Merge Operations
Journal of Network and Systems Management
Relations among privacy notions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
A three dimensional sender anonymity metric
International Journal of Security and Networks
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We perform a probabilistic analysis of onion routing. The analysis is presented in a black-box model of anonymous communication that abstracts the essential properties of onion routing in the presence of an active adversary that controls a portion of the network and knows all a priori distributions on user choices of destination. Our results quantify how much the adversary can gain in identifying users by exploiting knowledge of their probabilistic behavior. In particular, we show that a user uâ聙聶s anonymity is worst either when the other users always choose the destination u is least likely to visit or when the other users always choose the destination u chooses. This worst-case anonymity with an adversary that controls a fraction b of the routers is comparable to the bestcase anonymity against an adversary that controls a fraction pb.