Robust regression and outlier detection
Robust regression and outlier detection
Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Web Security, Privacy and Commerce
Web Security, Privacy and Commerce
A framework for using insurance for cyber-risk management
Communications of the ACM
Information revelation and privacy in online social networks
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Proceedings of the second ACM workshop on Digital identity management
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
An Identity-Free and On-Demand Routing Scheme against Anonymity Threats in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Probabilistic analysis of onion routing in a black-box model
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
On the Impact of Social Network Profiling on Anonymity
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Revisiting a combinatorial approach toward measuring anonymity
Proceedings of the 7th ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
De-anonymizing Social Networks
SP '09 Proceedings of the 2009 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
On the leakage of personally identifiable information via online social networks
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Towards an information theoretic metric for anonymity
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Vanish: increasing data privacy with self-destructing data
SSYM'09 Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
Anonymous connections and onion routing
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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Measuring the degree of anonymity provided by various anonymous systems on the web, is a challenging task. We first illustrate using examples that existing measures in literature are not sufficient to fully characterise the anonymity provided by a system. We then propose a new isolation measure, based upon outliers in a distribution, and show that this measure is critical towards quantifying the overall anonymity level. We provide justification for three distinct aspects of anonymity, important from the perspectives of a user, a system designer, and an attacker, leading to a three-dimensional approach towards measuring sender anonymity. We outline various properties of the proposed three-dimensional metric and illustrate how the metric, along with adjustable weights, can be used to compare different anonymous systems. Finally, we apply the proposed metric to existing anonymous systems and discuss insights which should prove useful in the design of future anonymous systems.