Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Tarzan: a peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Chord: a scalable peer-to-peer lookup protocol for internet applications
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Introducing Tarzan, a Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network Layer
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Hiding
From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types
IH '02 Revised Papers from the 5th International Workshop on Information Hiding
Defending Anonymous Communications Against Passive Logging Attacks
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
The predecessor attack: An analysis of a threat to anonymous communications systems
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Route Fingerprinting in Anonymous Communications
P2P '06 Proceedings of the Sixth IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing
Salsa: a structured approach to large-scale anonymity
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Cashmere: resilient anonymous routing
NSDI'05 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Symposium on Networked Systems Design & Implementation - Volume 2
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Probabilistic analysis of an anonymity system
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW15
Probabilistic analysis of onion routing in a black-box model
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Denial of service or denial of security?
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Sampled traffic analysis by internet-exchange-level adversaries
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
A Kademlia-Based Node Lookup System for Anonymization Networks
ISA '09 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference and Workshops on Advances in Information Security and Assurance
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Proceedings of the 9th annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Scalable anonymous communication with provable security
HotSec'10 Proceedings of the 5th USENIX conference on Hot topics in security
Anonymity analysis of P2P anonymous communication systems
Computer Communications
PIR-Tor: scalable anonymous communication using private information retrieval
SEC'11 Proceedings of the 20th USENIX conference on Security
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Information Leaks in Structured Peer-to-Peer Anonymous Communication Systems
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) - Special Issue on Computer and Communications Security
Changing of the guards: a framework for understanding and improving entry guard selection in tor
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
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Users building routes through an anonymization network must discover the nodes comprising the network. Yet, it is potentially costly, or even infeasible, for everyone to know the entire network. We introduce a novel attack, the route bridging attack, which makes use of what route creators do notknow of the network. We also present new discussion and results concerning route fingerprinting attacks, which make use of what route creators do know of the network. We prove analytic bounds for both route fingerprinting and route bridging and describe the impact of these attacks on published anonymity-network designs. We also discuss implications for network scaling and client-server vs. peer-to-peer systems.