Denial of service or denial of security?

  • Authors:
  • Nikita Borisov;George Danezis;Prateek Mittal;Parisa Tabriz

  • Affiliations:
  • University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL;K.U. Leuven, Leuven, Belgium;University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL;Google, Mountain View, CA

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

We consider the effect attackers who disrupt anonymous communications have on the security of traditional high- and low-latency anonymous communication systems, as well as on the Hydra-Onion and Cashmere systems that aim to offer reliable mixing, and Salsa, a peer-to-peer anonymous communication network. We show that denial of service (DoS) lowers anonymity as messages need to get retransmitted to be delivered, presenting more opportunities for attack. We uncover a fundamental limit on the security of mix networks, showing that they cannot tolerate a majority of nodes being malicious. Cashmere, Hydra-Onion, and Salsa security is also badly affected by DoS attackers. Our results are backed by probabilistic modeling and extensive simulations and are of direct applicability to deployed anonymity systems.