Chord: A scalable peer-to-peer lookup service for internet applications
Proceedings of the 2001 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Tarzan: a peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Introducing MorphMix: peer-to-peer based anonymous Internet usage with collusion detection
Proceedings of the 2002 ACM workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society
Kademlia: A Peer-to-Peer Information System Based on the XOR Metric
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
Anonymous Connections and Onion Routing
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Know thy neighbor's neighbor: the power of lookahead in randomized P2P networks
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Secure routing for structured peer-to-peer overlay networks
OSDI '02 Proceedings of the 5th symposium on Operating systems design and implementationCopyright restrictions prevent ACM from being able to make the PDFs for this conference available for downloading
AP3: cooperative, decentralized anonymous communication
Proceedings of the 11th workshop on ACM SIGOPS European workshop
Towards a scalable and robust DHT
Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Salsa: a structured approach to large-scale anonymity
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Denial of service or denial of security?
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
S/Kademlia: A practicable approach towards secure key-based routing
ICPADS '07 Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems - Volume 02
Proceedings of the 1st Workshop on Social Network Systems
Information leaks in structured peer-to-peer anonymous communication systems
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
SHALON: Lightweight Anonymization Based on Open Standards
ICCCN '09 Proceedings of the 2009 Proceedings of 18th International Conference on Computer Communications and Networks
Breaking the collusion detection mechanism of morphmix
PET'06 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Scalable anonymous communication with provable security
HotSec'10 Proceedings of the 5th USENIX conference on Hot topics in security
PIR-Tor: scalable anonymous communication using private information retrieval
SEC'11 Proceedings of the 20th USENIX conference on Security
Information Leaks in Structured Peer-to-Peer Anonymous Communication Systems
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) - Special Issue on Computer and Communications Security
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Network information distribution is a fundamental service for any anonymization network. Even though anonymization and information distribution about the network are two orthogonal issues, the design of the distribution service has a direct impact on the anonymization. Requiring each node to know about all other nodes in the network (as in Tor and AN.ON -- the most popular anonymization networks) limits scalability and offers a playground for intersection attacks. The distributed designs existing so far fail to meet security requirements and have therefore not been accepted in real networks. In this paper, we combine probabilistic analysis and simulation to explore DHT-based approaches for distributing network information in anonymization networks. Based on our findings we introduce NISAN, a novel approach that tries to scalably overcome known security problems. It allows for selecting nodes uniformly at random from the full set of all available peers, while each of the nodes has only limited knowledge about the network. We show that our scheme has properties similar to a centralized directory in terms of preventing malicious nodes from biasing the path selection. This is done, however, without requiring to trust any third party. At the same time our approach provides high scalability and adequate performance. Additionally, we analyze different design choices and come up with diverse proposals depending on the attacker model. The proposed combination of security, scalability, and simplicity, to the best of our knowledge, is not available in any other existing network information distribution system.