Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Web MIXes: a system for anonymous and unobservable Internet access
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
Choosing reputable servents in a P2P network
Proceedings of the 11th international conference on World Wide Web
Tarzan: a peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Hordes: a multicast based protocol for anonymity
Journal of Computer Security
Introducing MorphMix: peer-to-peer based anonymous Internet usage with collusion detection
Proceedings of the 2002 ACM workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
The Eigentrust algorithm for reputation management in P2P networks
WWW '03 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on World Wide Web
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Practical Anonymity for the Masses with Mix-Networks
WETICE '03 Proceedings of the Twelfth International Workshop on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises
The sybil attack in sensor networks: analysis & defenses
Proceedings of the 3rd international symposium on Information processing in sensor networks
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Fighting peer-to-peer SPAM and decoys with object reputation
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Economics of peer-to-peer systems
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Salsa: a structured approach to large-scale anonymity
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Don't Clog the Queue! Circuit Clogging and Mitigation in P2P Anonymity Schemes
Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Information leaks in structured peer-to-peer anonymous communication systems
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A Kademlia-Based Node Lookup System for Anonymization Networks
ISA '09 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference and Workshops on Advances in Information Security and Assurance
On anonymity in an electronic society: A survey of anonymous communication systems
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
NISAN: network information service for anonymization networks
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
ShadowWalker: peer-to-peer anonymous communication using redundant structured topologies
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Scalable onion routing with torsk
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Survey on anonymous communications in computer networks
Computer Communications
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Scalable anonymous communication with provable security
HotSec'10 Proceedings of the 5th USENIX conference on Hot topics in security
PIR-Tor: scalable anonymous communication using private information retrieval
SEC'11 Proceedings of the 20th USENIX conference on Security
Information Leaks in Structured Peer-to-Peer Anonymous Communication Systems
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) - Special Issue on Computer and Communications Security
Effectiveness and detection of denial-of-service attacks in tor
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Performance modelling of anonymity protocols
Performance Evaluation
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MorphMix is a peer-to-peer circuit-based mix network designed to provide low-latency anonymous communication. MorphMix nodes incrementally construct anonymous communication tunnels based on recommendations from other nodes in the system; this P2P approach allows it to scale to millions of users. However, by allowing unknown peers to aid in tunnel construction, MorphMix is vulnerable to colluding attackers that only offer other attacking nodes in their recommendations. To avoid building corrupt tunnels, MorphMix employs a collusion detection mechanism to identify this type of misbehavior. In this paper, we challenge the assumptions of the collusion detection mechanism and demonstrate that colluding adversaries can compromise a significant fraction of all anonymous tunnels, and in some cases, a majority of all tunnels built. Our results suggest that mechanisms based solely on a node's local knowledge of the network are not sufficient to solve the difficult problem of detecting colluding adversarial behavior in a P2P system and that more sophisticated schemes may be needed.