Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Towards an analysis of onion routing security
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
Introducing MorphMix: peer-to-peer based anonymous Internet usage with collusion detection
Proceedings of the 2002 ACM workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society
Defending Anonymous Communications Against Passive Logging Attacks
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Heartbeat traffic to counter (n-1) attacks: red-green-black mixes
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Hot or not: revealing hidden services by their clock skew
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Low-resource routing attacks against tor
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Denial of service or denial of security?
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Detecting Denial of Service Attacks in Tor
Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Sampled traffic analysis by internet-exchange-level adversaries
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Synchronous batching: from cascades to free routes
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Breaking the collusion detection mechanism of morphmix
PET'06 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
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Tor is one of the more popular systems for anonymizing near-real-time communications on the Internet. Borisov et al. [2007] proposed a denial-of-service-based attack on Tor (and related systems) that significantly increases the probability of compromising the anonymity provided. In this article, we analyze the effectiveness of the attack using both an analytic model and simulation. We also describe two algorithms for detecting such attacks, one deterministic and proved correct, the other probabilistic and verified in simulation.