Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Tarzan: a peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Introducing MorphMix: peer-to-peer based anonymous Internet usage with collusion detection
Proceedings of the 2002 ACM workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Hiding
Location diversity in anonymity networks
Proceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Secure routing for structured peer-to-peer overlay networks
OSDI '02 Proceedings of the 5th symposium on Operating systems design and implementationCopyright restrictions prevent ACM from being able to make the PDFs for this conference available for downloading
Tracking anonymous peer-to-peer VoIP calls on the internet
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Hot or not: revealing hidden services by their clock skew
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Reliable MIX cascade networks through reputation
FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
Sampled traffic analysis by internet-exchange-level adversaries
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
On the security of the tor authentication protocol
PET'06 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Denial of service or denial of security?
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Shining Light in Dark Places: Understanding the Tor Network
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Studying Timing Analysis on the Internet with SubRosa
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Compromising Anonymity Using Packet Spinning
ISC '08 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Information Security
Information leaks in structured peer-to-peer anonymous communication systems
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
PEON: privacy-enhanced opportunistic networks with applications in assistive environments
Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on PErvasive Technologies Related to Assistive Environments
Scalable Link-Based Relay Selection for Anonymous Routing
PETS '09 Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
As-awareness in Tor path selection
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A new cell counter based attack against tor
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on Cloud computing security
On the risks of serving whenever you surf: vulnerabilities in Tor's blocking resistance design
Proceedings of the 8th ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Proceedings of the 2010 ACM-BCS Visions of Computer Science Conference
EigenSpeed: secure peer-to-peer bandwidth evaluation
IPTPS'09 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Peer-to-peer systems
A potential HTTP-based application-level attack against Tor
Future Generation Computer Systems
Anonymity and monitoring: how to monitor the infrastructure of an anonymity system
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part C: Applications and Reviews
Preventing active timing attacks in low-latency anonymous communication
PETS'10 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Traffic analysis against low-latency anonymity networks using available bandwidth estimation
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
Empirical tests of anonymous voice over IP
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
Chipping away at censorship firewalls with user-generated content
USENIX Security'10 Proceedings of the 19th USENIX conference on Security
Privad: practical privacy in online advertising
Proceedings of the 8th USENIX conference on Networked systems design and implementation
Experience report: trading dependability, performance, and security through temporal decoupling
Proceedings of the 11th IFIP WG 6.1 international conference on Distributed applications and interoperable systems
ExperimenTor: a testbed for safe and realistic tor experimentation
CSET'11 Proceedings of the 4th conference on Cyber security experimentation and test
PIR-Tor: scalable anonymous communication using private information retrieval
SEC'11 Proceedings of the 20th USENIX conference on Security
DefenestraTor: throwing out windows in Tor
PETS'11 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Trust-based anonymous communication: adversary models and routing algorithms
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Forensic investigation of the OneSwarm anonymous filesharing system
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Uncovering social network sybils in the wild
Proceedings of the 2011 ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement conference
Minimising anonymity loss in anonymity networks under DoS attacks
ICICS'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information and communications security
"Mix-in-Place" anonymous networking using secure function evaluation
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Information Leaks in Structured Peer-to-Peer Anonymous Communication Systems
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) - Special Issue on Computer and Communications Security
Ferris wheel: A ring based onion circuit for hidden services
Computer Communications
Tor HTTP usage and information leakage
CMS'10 Proceedings of the 11th IFIP TC 6/TC 11 international conference on Communications and Multimedia Security
Malice versus AN.ON: possible risks of missing replay and integrity protection
FC'11 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Beyond TOR: the truenyms protocol
SIIS'11 Proceedings of the 2011 international conference on Security and Intelligent Information Systems
Anti-virus in-the-cloud service: are we ready for the security evolution?
Security and Communication Networks
Breaking Tor anonymity with game theory and data mining
Concurrency and Computation: Practice & Experience
Leaving timing-channel fingerprints in hidden service log files
Digital Investigation: The International Journal of Digital Forensics & Incident Response
A ring based onion circuit for hidden services
NordSec'11 Proceedings of the 16th Nordic conference on Information Security Technology for Applications
Instant degradation of anonymity in low-latency anonymisation systems
AIMS'12 Proceedings of the 6th IFIP WG 6.6 international autonomous infrastructure, management, and security conference on Dependable Networks and Services
A new cell-counting-based attack against Tor
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Methodically modeling the Tor network
CSET'12 Proceedings of the 5th USENIX conference on Cyber Security Experimentation and Test
Changing of the guards: a framework for understanding and improving entry guard selection in tor
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Effectiveness and detection of denial-of-service attacks in tor
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Probabilistic analysis of onion routing in a black-box model
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Dissent in numbers: making strong anonymity scale
OSDI'12 Proceedings of the 10th USENIX conference on Operating Systems Design and Implementation
Security and Communication Networks
Protocol-level attacks against Tor
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Message in a bottle: sailing past censorship
Proceedings of the 29th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Proactively accountable anonymous messaging in verdict
SEC'13 Proceedings of the 22nd USENIX conference on Security
SGor: Trust graph based onion routing
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Uncovering social network Sybils in the wild
ACM Transactions on Knowledge Discovery from Data (TKDD) - Casin special issue
The design and implementation of the A3 application-aware anonymity platform
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
How to block Tor's hidden bridges: detecting methods and countermeasures
The Journal of Supercomputing
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Tor has become one of the most popular overlay networks for anonymizing TCP traffic. Its popularity is due in part to its perceived strong anonymity properties and its relatively low latency service. Low latency is achieved through Torâ聙聶s ability to balance the traffic load by optimizing Tor router selection to probabilistically favor routers with highbandwidth capabilities. We investigate how Torâ聙聶s routing optimizations impact its ability to provide strong anonymity. Through experiments conducted on PlanetLab, we show the extent to which routing performance optimizations have left the system vulnerable to end-to-end traffic analysis attacks from non-global adversaries with minimal resources. Further, we demonstrate that entry guards, added to mitigate path disruption attacks, are themselves vulnerable to attack. Finally, we explore solutions to improve Torâ聙聶s current routing algorithms and propose alternative routing strategies that prevent some of the routing attacks used in our experiments.