Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Tarzan: a peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Introducing MorphMix: peer-to-peer based anonymous Internet usage with collusion detection
Proceedings of the 2002 ACM workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Hiding
Traffic Analysis Attacks and Trade-Offs in Anonymity Providing Systems
IHW '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Information Hiding
P5: A Protocol for Scalable Anonymous Communication
SP '02 Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Salsa: a structured approach to large-scale anonymity
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Cashmere: resilient anonymous routing
NSDI'05 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Symposium on Networked Systems Design & Implementation - Volume 2
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Low-resource routing attacks against tor
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Denial of service or denial of security?
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Practical traffic analysis: extending and resisting statistical disclosure
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
The traffic analysis of continuous-time mixes
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
CONCUR'10 Proceedings of the 21st international conference on Concurrency theory
Traffic analysis against low-latency anonymity networks using available bandwidth estimation
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
MOR: monitoring and measurements through the onion router
PAM'10 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Passive and active measurement
Minimising anonymity loss in anonymity networks under DoS attacks
ICICS'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information and communications security
Ferris wheel: A ring based onion circuit for hidden services
Computer Communications
Hi-index | 0.00 |
We present a novel attack targeting anonymizing systems. The attack involves placing a malicious relay node inside an anonymizing system and keeping legitimate nodes "busy."We achieve this by creating circular circuits and injecting fraudulent packets, crafted in a way that will make them spin an arbitrary number of times inside our artificial loops. At the same time we inject a small number of malicious nodes that we control into the anonymizing system. By keeping a significant part of the anonymizing system busy spinning useless packets, we increase the probability of having our nodes selected in the creation of legitimate circuits, since we have more free capacity to route requests than the legitimate nodes. This technique may lead to the compromise of the anonymity of people using the system.To evaluate our novel attack, we used a real-world anonymizing system, TOR. We show that an anonymizing system that is composed of a series of relay nodes which perform cryptographic operations is vulnerable to our packet spinning attack. Our evaluation focuses on determining the cost we can introduce to the legitimate nodes by injecting the fraudulent packets, and the time required for a malicious client to create n-lengthTOR circuits. Furthermore we prove that routers that are involved in packet spinning do not have the capacity to process requests for the creation of new circuits and thus users are forced to select our malicious nodes for routing their data streams.