Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Tarzan: a peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A Reputation System to Increase MIX-Net Reliability
IHW '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Information Hiding
TrustMe: Anonymous Management of Trust Relationships in Decentralized P2P Systems
P2P '03 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing
Trust and Reputation Model in Peer-to-Peer Networks
P2P '03 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Salsa: a structured approach to large-scale anonymity
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Theoretical Computer Science - Automated reasoning for security protocol analysis
Cashmere: resilient anonymous routing
NSDI'05 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Symposium on Networked Systems Design & Implementation - Volume 2
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Incentive-Driven P2P Anonymity System: A Game-Theoretic Approach
ICPP '07 Proceedings of the 2007 International Conference on Parallel Processing
Low-resource routing attacks against tor
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Denial of service or denial of security?
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Compromising Anonymity Using Packet Spinning
ISC '08 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Information Security
Scalable onion routing with torsk
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
How much anonymity does network latency leak?
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Reliable MIX cascade networks through reputation
FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
Improving efficiency and simplicity of Tor circuit establishment and hidden services
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
PETS'10 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
CONCUR'10 Proceedings of the 21st international conference on Concurrency theory
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Anonymity is a security property of paramount importance as it helps to protect users' privacy by ensuring that their identity remains unknown. Anonymity protocols generally suffer from denial of service (DoS) attack, as repeated message retransmission affords more opportunities for attackers to analyse traffic and lower the protocols' privacy. In this paper, we analyse how users can minimise their anonymity loss under DoS attacks by choosing to remove or keep 'failed' nodes from router lists. We also investigate the strategy effectiveness in those cases where users cannot decide whether the 'failed' node are the targets of DoS attacks.