Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Hiding
ACSAC '96 Proceedings of the 12th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Protocols for Key Establishment and Authentication
Protocols for Key Establishment and Authentication
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Hot or not: revealing hidden services by their clock skew
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Valet services: improving hidden servers with a personal touch
PET'06 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
On the security of the tor authentication protocol
PET'06 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Anonymous connections and onion routing
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Disappearing Cryptography: Information Hiding: Steganography & Watermarking
Disappearing Cryptography: Information Hiding: Steganography & Watermarking
Performance Measurements of Tor Hidden Services in Low-Bandwidth Access Networks
ACNS '09 Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
On anonymity in an electronic society: A survey of anonymous communication systems
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
An anonymous communication mechanism without key infrastructure based on multi-paths network coding
GLOBECOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Global telecommunications
IPsec-based anonymous networking: a working implementation
ICC'09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE international conference on Communications
Anonymity and monitoring: how to monitor the infrastructure of an anonymity system
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part C: Applications and Reviews
Pairing-Based Onion Routing with Improved Forward Secrecy
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Fully non-interactive onion routing with forward-secrecy
ACNS'11 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
Minimising anonymity loss in anonymity networks under DoS attacks
ICICS'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information and communications security
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Cryptographic protocol analysis of AN.ON
FC'10 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Using sphinx to improve onion routing circuit construction
FC'10 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Ace: an efficient key-exchange protocol for onion routing
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Secure communication over diverse transports: [short paper]
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Probabilistic analysis of onion routing in a black-box model
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Anonymity and one-way authentication in key exchange protocols
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
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In this paper we demonstrate how to reduce the overhead and delay of circuit establishment in the Tor anonymizing network by using predistributed Diffie-Hellman values. We eliminate the use of RSA encryption and decryption from circuit setup, and we reduce the number of DH exponentiations vs. the current Tor circuit setup protocol while maintaining immediate forward secrecy. We also describe savings that can be obtained by precomputing during idle cycles values that can be determined before the protocol starts. We introduce the distinction of eventual vs. immediate forward secrecy and present protocols that illustrate the distinction. These protocols are even more efficient in communication and computation than the one we primarily propose, but they provide only eventual forward secrecy. We describe how to reduce the overhead and the complexity of hidden server connections by using our DH-values to implement valet nodes and eliminate the need for rendezvous points as they exist today. We also discuss the security of the new elements and an analysis of efficiency improvements.