Communication Systems for the Mobile Information Society
Communication Systems for the Mobile Information Society
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Performance Analysis of Anonymous Communication Channels Provided by Tor
ARES '08 Proceedings of the 2008 Third International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security
Performance Measurements and Statistics of Tor Hidden Services
SAINT '08 Proceedings of the 2008 International Symposium on Applications and the Internet
Improving efficiency and simplicity of Tor circuit establishment and hidden services
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Performance comparison of low-latency anonymisation services from a user perspective
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Low latency anonymous communication: how long are users willing to wait?
ETRICS'06 Proceedings of the 2006 international conference on Emerging Trends in Information and Communication Security
Statistical disclosure or intersection attacks on anonymity systems
IH'04 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information Hiding
Secure encounter-based social networks: requirements, challenges, and designs
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A case study on measuring statistical data in the tor anonymity network
FC'10 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Financial cryptograpy and data security
Review: A survey on solutions and main free tools for privacy enhancing Web communications
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
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Being able to access and provide Internet services anonymously is an important mechanism to ensure freedom of speech in vast parts of the world. Offering location-hidden services on the Internet requires complex redirection protocols to obscure the locations and identities of communication partners. The anonymity system Tor supports such a protocol for providing and accessing TCP-based services anonymously. The complexity of the hidden service protocol results in significantly higher response times which is, however, a crucial barrier to user acceptance. This communication overhead becomes even more evident when using limited access networks like cellular phone networks. We provide comprehensive measurements and statistical analysis of the bootstrapping of client processes and different sub-steps of the Tor hidden service protocol under the influence of limited access networks. Thereby, we are able to identify bottlenecks for low-bandwidth access networks and to suggest improvements regarding these networks.