End-to-end routing behavior in the Internet
Conference proceedings on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Handbook of Parametric and Nonparametric Statistical Procedures
Handbook of Parametric and Nonparametric Statistical Procedures
Low latency anonymous communication: how long are users willing to wait?
ETRICS'06 Proceedings of the 2006 international conference on Emerging Trends in Information and Communication Security
Privacy enhanced technologies: methods – markets – misuse
TrustBus'05 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Trust, Privacy, and Security in Digital Business
On the PET workshop panel “mix cascades versus peer-to-peer: is one concept superior?”
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Shining Light in Dark Places: Understanding the Tor Network
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Performance Measurements of Tor Hidden Services in Low-Bandwidth Access Networks
ACNS '09 Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on Cloud computing security
A case study on measuring statistical data in the tor anonymity network
FC'10 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Financial cryptograpy and data security
Anonymous overlay network supporting authenticated routing
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Comparison of low-latency anonymous communication systems: practical usage and performance
AISC '11 Proceedings of the Ninth Australasian Information Security Conference - Volume 116
How (not) to build a transport layer for anonymity overlays
ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
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Neither of the two anonymisation services Tor and AN.ON clearly outperforms the other one. AN.ON's user-perceived QoS is generally more consistent over time than Tor's. While AN.ON's network latencies are low compared to Tor, it suffers from limitations in bandwidth. Interestingly, Tor's performance seems to depend on the time of day: it increases in the European morning hours. Utilising AN.ON's reporting of concurrently logged-in users, we show a correlation between load and performance. The reported number of users should be adjusted, though, so that it serves as a better indicator for security and performance. Finally, the results indicate the existence of an overall tolerance level for acceptable latencies of approximately 4 seconds, which should be kept in mind when designing low-latency anonymisation services.