Security without identification: transaction systems to make big brother obsolete
Communications of the ACM
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Anonymity, unobservability, and pseudeonymity — a proposal for terminology
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
The disadvantages of free MIX routes and how to overcome them
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
Web MIXes: a system for anonymous and unobservable Internet access
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Tarzan: a peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
Making Mix Nets Robust for Electronic Voting by Randomized Partial Checking
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
A Reputation System to Increase MIX-Net Reliability
IHW '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Information Hiding
Traffic Analysis Attacks and Trade-Offs in Anonymity Providing Systems
IHW '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Information Hiding
Limits of Anonymity in Open Environments
IH '02 Revised Papers from the 5th International Workshop on Information Hiding
From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types
IH '02 Revised Papers from the 5th International Workshop on Information Hiding
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Reliable MIX cascade networks through reputation
FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
Towards an information theoretic metric for anonymity
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Dummy traffic against long term intersection attacks
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Reasoning about the anonymity provided by pool mixes that generate dummy traffic
IH'04 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information Hiding
Synchronous batching: from cascades to free routes
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Performance comparison of low-latency anonymisation services from a user perspective
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Impact of network topology on anonymity and overhead in low-latency anonymity networks
PETS'10 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
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Editors' note. Following the panel discussion on Mix Cascades versus P2P at PET 2004, we invited the original panel proposers to write a summary of the discussion for the proceedings. This is their contribution. After almost two decades of research on anonymous network communication the development has forked into two main directions, namely Mix cascades and peer-to-peer (P2P) networks. As these design options have implications on the achievable anonymity and performance, this paper aims to elaborate the advantages and disadvantages of either concept. After clarifying the scope of the discussion, we present arguments for Mix cascades and P2P designs on multiple areas of interest: the level of anonymity, the incentives to cooperate, aspects of availability, and performance issues. Pointed thesis and antithesis are given for both sides, before a final synthesis tries to articulate the status quo of the discussion.