Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
Communications of the ACM
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Tarzan: a peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Introducing MorphMix: peer-to-peer based anonymous Internet usage with collusion detection
Proceedings of the 2002 ACM workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society
Identity-Based Encryption from the Weil Pairing
CRYPTO '01 Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Hiding
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Sphinx: A Compact and Provably Secure Mix Format
SP '09 Proceedings of the 2009 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A forward-secure public-key encryption scheme
EUROCRYPT'03 Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on Theory and applications of cryptographic techniques
Provably secure public-key encryption for length-preserving chaumian mixes
CT-RSA'03 Proceedings of the 2003 RSA conference on The cryptographers' track
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Improving efficiency and simplicity of Tor circuit establishment and hidden services
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Pairing-Based Onion Routing with Improved Forward Secrecy
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
A formal treatment of onion routing
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Hierarchical identity based encryption with constant size ciphertext
EUROCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Using sphinx to improve onion routing circuit construction
FC'10 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
On the security of the tor authentication protocol
PET'06 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Anonymous connections and onion routing
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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In this paper we put forward a new onion routing protocol which achieves forward secrecy in a fully non-interactive fashion, without requiring any communication from the router and/or the users and the service provider to update time-related keys. We compare this to TOR which requires O(n2) rounds of interaction to establish a circuit of size n. In terms of the computational effort required to the parties, our protocol is comparable to TOR, but the network latency associated with TOR's high round complexity ends up dominating the running time. Compared to other recently proposed alternative to TOR (such as the PB-OR and CL-OR protocols) our scheme still has the advantage of being non-interactive (both PB-OR and CL-OR require some interaction to update time-sensitive information), and achieves similar computational performances. We performed extensive implementation and simulation tests that confirm our theoretical analysis. Additionally, while comparing our scheme to PB-OR, we discovered a flaw in the security of that scheme which we repair in this paper. Our solution is based on the application of forward-secure encryption. We design a forward-secure encryption scheme (of independent interest) to be used as the main encryption scheme in an onion routing protocol.