Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Reaction Attacks against several Public-Key Cryptosystems
ICICS '99 Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Information and Communication Security
RSA-OAEP Is Secure under the RSA Assumption
CRYPTO '01 Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA Encryption Standard PKCS #1
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Relations Among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption Schemes
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Concrete Security Characterizations of PRFs and PRPs: Reductions and Applications
ASIACRYPT '00 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Low-resource routing attacks against tor
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Shining Light in Dark Places: Understanding the Tor Network
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Improving efficiency and simplicity of Tor circuit establishment and hidden services
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
A model of onion routing with provable anonymity
FC'07/USEC'07 Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Financial cryptography and 1st International conference on Usable Security
Introducing perfect forward secrecy for AN.ON
EUNICE'10 Proceedings of the 16th EUNICE/IFIP WG 6.6 conference on Networked services and applications: engineering, control and management
Pairing-Based Onion Routing with Improved Forward Secrecy
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Drac: an architecture for anonymous low-volume communications
PETS'10 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
A pairing based cryptographic anonymous authentication scheme
Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Ubiquitous Information Management and Communication
Fully non-interactive onion routing with forward-secrecy
ACNS'11 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
Secure internet voting on limited devices with anonymized DSA public keys
EVT/WOTE'11 Proceedings of the 2011 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Cryptographic protocol analysis of AN.ON
FC'10 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Anonymity and one-way authentication in key exchange protocols
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
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Tor is a popular anonymous Internet communication system, used by an estimated 250,000 users to anonymously exchange over five terabytes of data per day. The security of Tor depends on properly authenticating nodes to clients, but Tor uses a custom protocol, rather than an established one, to perform this authentication. In this paper, we provide a formal proof of security of this protocol, in the random oracle model, under reasonable cryptographic assumptions.