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This paper presents an Internet voting protocol, which is primarily designed for limited voting devices such as smart cards or mobile phones. The minimum requirement for these devices is the ability to compute one El-Gamal encryption and one DSA signature in reasonable time. The protocol is based on an anonymization mechanism for DSA public keys, which can be installed on top of an existing DSA public-key infrastructure for each individual voting event. The protocol protects the privacy of the voters and offers public verifiability, but it is not receipt-free or coercion-resistant. As a countermeasure against vote buying or coercion attacks, it can be used as the electronic component of a hybrid voting system.