Benaloh's dense probabilistic encryption revisited
AFRICACRYPT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Progress in cryptology in Africa
Running mixnet-based elections with Helios
EVT/WOTE'11 Proceedings of the 2011 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Secure internet voting on limited devices with anonymized DSA public keys
EVT/WOTE'11 Proceedings of the 2011 conference on Electronic voting technology/workshop on trustworthy elections
Efficient zero-knowledge argument for correctness of a shuffle
EUROCRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 31st Annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Private over-threshold aggregation protocols
ICISC'12 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
Reliable medical recommendation systems with patient privacy
ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology (TIST) - Survey papers, special sections on the semantic adaptive social web, intelligent systems for health informatics, regular papers
Batch proofs of partial knowledge
ACNS'13 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
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A shuffle consists of a permutation and re-encryption of a set of input ciphertexts. One application of shuffles is to build mix-nets. We suggest an honest verifier zero-knowledge argument for the correctness of a shuffle of homomorphic encryptions. Our scheme is more efficient than previous schemes both in terms of communication and computation. The honest verifier zero-knowledge argument has a size that is independent of the actual cryptosystem being used and will typically be smaller than the size of the shuffle itself. Moreover, our scheme is well suited for the use of multi-exponentiation and batch-verification techniques. Additionally, we suggest a more efficient honest verifier zero-knowledge argument for a commitment containing a permutation of a set of publicly known messages. We also suggest an honest verifier zero-knowledge argument for the correctness of a combined shuffle-and-decrypt operation that can be used in connection with decrypting mix-nets based on ElGamal encryption. All our honest verifier zero-knowledge arguments can be turned into honest verifier zero-knowledge proofs. We use homomorphic commitments as an essential part of our schemes. When the commitment scheme is statistically hiding we obtain statistical honest verifier zero-knowledge arguments; when the commitment scheme is statistically binding, we obtain computational honest verifier zero-knowledge proofs.