How to construct random functions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
How to construct pseudorandom permutations from pseudorandom functions
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
The Security of Cipher Block Chaining
CRYPTO '94 Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
XOR MACs: New Methods for Message Authentication Using Finite Pseudorandom Functions
CRYPTO '95 Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Keying Hash Functions for Message Authentication
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
A Concrete Security Treatment of Symmetric Encryption
FOCS '97 Proceedings of the 38th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Pseudorandom functions revisited: the cascade construction and its concrete security
FOCS '96 Proceedings of the 37th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
About the security of ciphers (semantic security and pseudo-random permutations)
SAC'04 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography
On the security of the tor authentication protocol
PET'06 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
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We investigate several alternate characterizations of pseudorandom functions (PRFs) and pseudorandom permutations (PRPs) in a concrete security setting. By analyzing the concrete complexity of the reductions between the standard notions and the alternate ones, we show that the latter, while equivalent under polynomial-time reductions, are weaker in the concrete security sense. With these alternate notions, we argue that it is possible to get better concrete security bounds for certain PRF/PRP-based schemes. As an example, we show how using an alternate characterization of a PRF could result in tighter security bounds for some types of message authentication codes. We also use this method to give a simple concrete security analysis of the counter mode of encryption. In addition, our results provide some insight into how injectivity impacts pseudorandomness.