Security without identification: transaction systems to make big brother obsolete
Communications of the ACM
Distributed Algorithms
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Hiding
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Towards an information theoretic metric for anonymity
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
A formal treatment of onion routing
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
On the security of the tor authentication protocol
PET'06 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
An Indistinguishability-Based Characterization of Anonymous Channels
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Survey on anonymous communications in computer networks
Computer Communications
Complexity of anonymity for security protocols
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
"Mix-in-Place" anonymous networking using secure function evaluation
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Probabilistic analysis of onion routing in a black-box model
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
On the limits of provable anonymity
Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society
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Onion routing is a scheme for anonymous communication that is designed for practical use. Until now, however, it has had no formal model and therefore no rigorous analysis of its anonymity guarantees. We give an IO-automata model of an onion-routing protocol and, under possibilistic definitions, characterize the situations in which anonymity and unlinkability are guaranteed.