The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Anonymity, unobservability, and pseudeonymity — a proposal for terminology
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
Towards an analysis of onion routing security
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
Distributed Algorithms
Tarzan: a peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
ESORICS '96 Proceedings of the 4th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
Group Principals and the Formalization of Anonymity
FM '99 Proceedings of the Wold Congress on Formal Methods in the Development of Computing Systems-Volume I - Volume I
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Hiding
Limits of Anonymity in Open Environments
IH '02 Revised Papers from the 5th International Workshop on Information Hiding
The predecessor attack: An analysis of a threat to anonymous communications systems
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Anonymity and information hiding in multiagent systems
Journal of Computer Security
Measuring relationship anonymity in mix networks
Proceedings of the 5th ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Salsa: a structured approach to large-scale anonymity
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Hot or not: revealing hidden services by their clock skew
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Privacy-preserving sharing and correction of security alerts
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Probabilistic analysis of an anonymity system
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW15
Information hiding, anonymity and privacy: a modular approach
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on WITS'02
Low-resource routing attacks against tor
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
ShadowWalker: peer-to-peer anonymous communication using redundant structured topologies
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Scalable onion routing with torsk
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on Cloud computing security
How much anonymity does network latency leak?
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Towards an information theoretic metric for anonymity
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Improving efficiency and simplicity of Tor circuit establishment and hidden services
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
A model of onion routing with provable anonymity
FC'07/USEC'07 Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Financial cryptography and 1st International conference on Usable Security
Dissent: accountable anonymous group messaging
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Statistical disclosure or intersection attacks on anonymity systems
IH'04 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information Hiding
Practical traffic analysis: extending and resisting statistical disclosure
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
A formal treatment of onion routing
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Anonymous connections and onion routing
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Provably Secure and Practical Onion Routing
CSF '12 Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE 25th Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Users get routed: traffic correlation on tor by realistic adversaries
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
On the limits of provable anonymity
Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society
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We perform a probabilistic analysis of onion routing. The analysis is presented in a black-box model of anonymous communication in the Universally Composable (UC) framework that abstracts the essential properties of onion routing in the presence of an active adversary who controls a portion of the network and knows all a priori distributions on user choices of destination. Our results quantify how much the adversary can gain in identifying users by exploiting knowledge of their probabilistic behavior. In particular, we show that, in the limit as the network gets large, a user u's anonymity is worst either when the other users always choose the destination u is least likely to visit or when the other users always choose the destination u chooses. This worst-case anonymity with an adversary that controls a fraction b of the routers is shown to be comparable to the best-case anonymity against an adversary that controls a fraction √b.