Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Traffic analysis: protocols, attacks, design issues, and open problems
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
The disadvantages of free MIX routes and how to overcome them
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
Web MIXes: a system for anonymous and unobservable Internet access
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
Tarzan: a peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Traffic Analysis Attacks and Trade-Offs in Anonymity Providing Systems
IHW '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Information Hiding
Limits of Anonymity in Open Environments
IH '02 Revised Papers from the 5th International Workshop on Information Hiding
From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types
IH '02 Revised Papers from the 5th International Workshop on Information Hiding
SNDSS '96 Proceedings of the 1996 Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security (SNDSS '96)
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Defending Anonymous Communications Against Passive Logging Attacks
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Can pseudonymity really guarantee privacy?
SSYM'00 Proceedings of the 9th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 9
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Reliable MIX cascade networks through reputation
FC'02 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Financial cryptography
Dummy traffic against long term intersection attacks
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Statistical disclosure or intersection attacks on anonymity systems
IH'04 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information Hiding
Anonymous connections and onion routing
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Location diversity in anonymity networks
Proceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
The pynchon gate: a secure method of pseudonymous mail retrieval
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
On the effectiveness of k;-anonymity against traffic analysis and surveillance
Proceedings of the 5th ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Salsa: a structured approach to large-scale anonymity
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Probabilistic analysis of onion routing in a black-box model
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Does additional information always reduce anonymity?
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
How much anonymity does network latency leak?
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Passive-Logging Attacks Against Anonymous Communications Systems
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Perfect Matching Disclosure Attacks
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
On the Impact of Social Network Profiling on Anonymity
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
How to Bypass Two Anonymity Revocation Schemes
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Don't Clog the Queue! Circuit Clogging and Mitigation in P2P Anonymity Schemes
Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Compromising Anonymity Using Packet Spinning
ISC '08 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Information Security
Information leaks in structured peer-to-peer anonymous communication systems
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
PEON: privacy-enhanced opportunistic networks with applications in assistive environments
Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on PErvasive Technologies Related to Assistive Environments
On anonymity in an electronic society: A survey of anonymous communication systems
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Vida: How to Use Bayesian Inference to De-anonymize Persistent Communications
PETS '09 Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
The bayesian traffic analysis of mix networks
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
On the risks of serving whenever you surf: vulnerabilities in Tor's blocking resistance design
Proceedings of the 8th ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
How much anonymity does network latency leak?
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Attacking unlinkability: the importance of context
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Two-sided statistical disclosure attack
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
The reverse statistical disclosure attack
IH'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information hiding
A practical complexity-theoretic analysis of mix systems
ESORICS'11 Proceedings of the 16th European conference on Research in computer security
Trust-based anonymous communication: adversary models and routing algorithms
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
"Mix-in-Place" anonymous networking using secure function evaluation
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
An interval centroid based spread spectrum watermarking scheme for multi-flow traceback
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
Information Leaks in Structured Peer-to-Peer Anonymous Communication Systems
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) - Special Issue on Computer and Communications Security
Blending different latency traffic with alpha-mixing
PET'06 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Fingerprinting attack on the tor anonymity system
ICICS'09 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Information and Communications Security
Tor HTTP usage and information leakage
CMS'10 Proceedings of the 11th IFIP TC 6/TC 11 international conference on Communications and Multimedia Security
Understanding statistical disclosure: a least squares approach
PETS'12 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
A game-theoretic approach to anonymous networking
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Probabilistic analysis of onion routing in a black-box model
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Security and Communication Networks
Countering statistical disclosure with receiver-bound cover traffic
ESORICS'07 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Review: An overview of anonymity technology usage
Computer Communications
Hang with your buddies to resist intersection attacks
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
You cannot hide for long: de-anonymization of real-world dynamic behaviour
Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society
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We extend earlier research on mounting and resisting passive long-term end-to-end traffic analysis attacks against anonymous message systems, by describing how an eavesdropper can learn sender-receiver connections even when the substrate is a network of pool mixes, the attacker is non-global, and senders have complex behavior or generate padding messages. Additionally, we describe how an attacker can use information about message distinguishability to speed the attack. We simulate our attacks for a variety of scenarios, focusing on the amount of information needed to link senders to their recipients. In each scenario, we show that the intersection attack is slowed but still succeeds against a steady-state mix network. We find that the attack takes an impractical amount of time when message delivery times are highly variable; when the attacker can observe very little of the network; and when users pad consistently and the adversary does not know how the network behaves in their absence.