The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Tarzan: a peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Introducing MorphMix: peer-to-peer based anonymous Internet usage with collusion detection
Proceedings of the 2002 ACM workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society
Traffic Analysis Attacks and Trade-Offs in Anonymity Providing Systems
IHW '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Information Hiding
SNDSS '96 Proceedings of the 1996 Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security (SNDSS '96)
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Identifying Proxy Nodes in a Tor Anonymization Circuit
SITIS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE International Conference on Signal Image Technology and Internet Based Systems
Fingerprinting websites using traffic analysis
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Two-sided statistical disclosure attack
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Practical traffic analysis: extending and resisting statistical disclosure
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Touching from a distance: website fingerprinting attacks and defenses
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
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We present a novel way to implement a fingerprinting attack against Onion Routing anonymity systems such as Tor. Our attack is a realistic threat in the sense that it can be mounted by a single controller of entrance routers and furthermore require very few resources. The conventional fingerprinting attack based on incoming traffic does not work straightforwardly against Tor due to its multiplex and quantized nature of traffic. By contrast, our novel attack can degrade Tor's anonymity by a metric based on both incoming and outgoing packets. In addition, our method keeps the fingerprinting attack's advantage of being realistic in terms of the few required resources. Regarding evaluation, the effectiveness of our method is discussed in a comprehensive manner: experimentally and theoretically. In order to enhance further studies and show the significance of our idea, we also discuss methods for defending against our attack and other applications of our idea.