Touching from a distance: website fingerprinting attacks and defenses

  • Authors:
  • Xiang Cai;Xin Cheng Zhang;Brijesh Joshi;Rob Johnson

  • Affiliations:
  • Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY, USA;Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY, USA;Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY, USA;Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY, USA

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

We present a novel web page fingerprinting attack that is able to defeat several recently proposed defenses against traffic analysis attacks, including the application-level defenses HTTPOS and randomized pipelining over Tor. Regardless of the defense scheme, our attack was able to guess which of 100 web pages a victim was visiting at least 50% of the time and, with some defenses, over 90% of the time. Our attack is based on a simple model of network behavior and out-performs previously proposed ad hoc attacks. We then build a web site fingerprinting attack that is able to identify whether a victim is visiting a particular web site with over 90% accuracy in our experiments. Our results strongly suggest that ad hoc defenses against traffic analysis are not likely to succeed. Consequently, we describe a defense scheme that provides provable security properties, albeit with potentially higher overheads.