Algorithms on strings, trees, and sequences: computer science and computational biology
Algorithms on strings, trees, and sequences: computer science and computational biology
The String-to-String Correction Problem
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A guided tour to approximate string matching
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Statistical Identification of Encrypted Web Browsing Traffic
SP '02 Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Inferring the source of encrypted HTTP connections
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
On Inferring Application Protocol Behaviors in Encrypted Network Traffic
The Journal of Machine Learning Research
Timing analysis of keystrokes and timing attacks on SSH
SSYM'01 Proceedings of the 10th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 10
Revealing skype traffic: when randomness plays with you
Proceedings of the 2007 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Devices that tell on you: privacy trends in consumer ubiquitous computing
SS'07 Proceedings of 16th USENIX Security Symposium on USENIX Security Symposium
Fingerprinting websites using traffic analysis
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Privacy vulnerabilities in encrypted HTTP streams
PET'05 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Tetherway: a framework for tethering camouflage
Proceedings of the fifth ACM conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks
Touching from a distance: website fingerprinting attacks and defenses
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
PPI: towards precise page identification for encrypted web-browsing traffic
ANCS '13 Proceedings of the ninth ACM/IEEE symposium on Architectures for networking and communications systems
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We consider website fingerprinting over encrypted and prox-ied channel. It has been shown that information on packet sizes is sufficient to achieve good identification accuracy. Recently, traffic morphing [1] was proposed to thwart website fingerprinting by changing the packet size distribution so as to mimic some other website, while minimizing bandwidth overhead. In this paper, we point out that packet ordering information, though noisy, can be utilized to enhance website fingerprinting. In addition, traces of the ordering information remain even under traffic morphing and they can be extracted for identification. When web access is performed over OpenSSH and 2000 profiled websites, the identification accuracy of our scheme reaches 81%, which is 11% better than Liberatore and Levine's scheme presented in CCS'06 [2]. We are able to identify 78% of the morphed traffic among 2000 websites while Liberatore and Levine's scheme identifies only 52%. Our analysis suggests that an effective countermeasure to website fingerprinting should not only hide the packet size distribution, but also aggressively remove the ordering information.