Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Limits of Anonymity in Open Environments
IH '02 Revised Papers from the 5th International Workshop on Information Hiding
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Nonesuch: a mix network with sender unobservability
Proceedings of the 5th ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Measuring Anonymity: The Disclosure Attack
IEEE Security and Privacy
Statistical disclosure or intersection attacks on anonymity systems
IH'04 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information Hiding
The hitting set attack on anonymity protocols
IH'04 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information Hiding
Practical traffic analysis: extending and resisting statistical disclosure
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Perfect Matching Disclosure Attacks
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
An HMM Approach to Anonymity Analysis of Continuous Mixes
Advanced Web and NetworkTechnologies, and Applications
Quantifying maximal loss of anonymity in protocols
Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Information, Computer, and Communications Security
On anonymity in an electronic society: A survey of anonymous communication systems
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Vida: How to Use Bayesian Inference to De-anonymize Persistent Communications
PETS '09 Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
The bayesian traffic analysis of mix networks
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Slotted packet counting attacks on anonymity protocols
AISC '09 Proceedings of the Seventh Australasian Conference on Information Security - Volume 98
The reverse statistical disclosure attack
IH'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information hiding
A practical complexity-theoretic analysis of mix systems
ESORICS'11 Proceedings of the 16th European conference on Research in computer security
Blending different latency traffic with alpha-mixing
PET'06 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Fingerprinting attack on the tor anonymity system
ICICS'09 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Information and Communications Security
Understanding statistical disclosure: a least squares approach
PETS'12 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
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We introduce a new traffic analysis attack: the Two-sided Statistical Disclosure Attack, that tries to uncover the receivers of messages sent through an anonymizing network supporting anonymous replies. We provide an abstract model of an anonymity system with users that reply to messages. Based on this model, we propose a linear approximation describing the likely receivers of sent messages. Using simulations, we evaluate the new attack given different traffic characteristics and we show that it is superior to previous attacks when replies are routed in the system.