Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Traffic analysis: protocols, attacks, design issues, and open problems
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
Limits of Anonymity in Open Environments
IH '02 Revised Papers from the 5th International Workshop on Information Hiding
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A New Statistical Hitting Set Attack on Anonymity Protocols
CIS '07 Proceedings of the 2007 International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Security
Perfect Matching Disclosure Attacks
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Measuring Anonymity: The Disclosure Attack
IEEE Security and Privacy
On anonymity in an electronic society: A survey of anonymous communication systems
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Vida: How to Use Bayesian Inference to De-anonymize Persistent Communications
PETS '09 Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Breaking Anonymity by Learning a Unique Minimum Hitting Set
CSR '09 Proceedings of the Fourth International Computer Science Symposium in Russia on Computer Science - Theory and Applications
Towards an information theoretic metric for anonymity
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Two-sided statistical disclosure attack
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
The reverse statistical disclosure attack
IH'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information hiding
A practical complexity-theoretic analysis of mix systems
ESORICS'11 Proceedings of the 16th European conference on Research in computer security
Statistical disclosure or intersection attacks on anonymity systems
IH'04 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information Hiding
The hitting set attack on anonymity protocols
IH'04 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information Hiding
Practical traffic analysis: extending and resisting statistical disclosure
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
You cannot hide for long: de-anonymization of real-world dynamic behaviour
Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society
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It is widely accepted that Disclosure Attacks are effective against high-latency anonymous communication systems. A number of Disclosure Attack variants can be found in the literature that effectively de-anonymize traffic sent through a threshold mix. Nevertheless, these attacks' performance has been mostly evaluated through simulation and how their effectiveness varies with the parameters of the system is not well-understood. We present the LSDA, a novel disclosure attack based on the Maximum Likelihood (ML) approach, in which user profiles are estimated solving a Least Squares problem. Further, contrary to previous heuristic-based attacks, our approach allows to analytically derive formulae that characterize the profiling error of the LSDA with respect to the system's parameters. We verify through simulation that our predictors for the error closely model reality, and that the LSDA recovers users' profiles with greater accuracy than its predecessors.