Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
The disadvantages of free MIX routes and how to overcome them
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Hiding
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Fundamental Limits on the Anonymity Provided by the MIX Technique
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Revisiting the uniqueness of simple demographics in the US population
Proceedings of the 5th ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Robust De-anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Perfect Matching Disclosure Attacks
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
On the Impact of Social Network Profiling on Anonymity
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Measuring Anonymity: The Disclosure Attack
IEEE Security and Privacy
De-anonymizing Social Networks
SP '09 Proceedings of the 2009 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Vida: How to Use Bayesian Inference to De-anonymize Persistent Communications
PETS '09 Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
EUROCRYPT'95 Proceedings of the 14th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
EUROCRYPT'95 Proceedings of the 14th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
A Practical Attack to De-anonymize Social Network Users
SP '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A practical complexity-theoretic analysis of mix systems
ESORICS'11 Proceedings of the 16th European conference on Research in computer security
The hitting set attack on anonymity protocols
IH'04 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information Hiding
Practical traffic analysis: extending and resisting statistical disclosure
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Understanding statistical disclosure: a least squares approach
PETS'12 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
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Disclosure attacks against anonymization systems have traditionally assumed that users exhibit stable patterns of communications in the long term. We use datasets of real traffic to show that this assumption does not hold: usage patterns email, mailing lists, and location-based services are dynamic in nature. We introduce the sequential statistical disclosure technique, which explicitly takes into account the evolution of user behavior over time and outperforms traditional profiling techniques, both at detection and quantification of rates of actions. Our results demonstrate that despite the changing patterns of use: low sending rates to specific receivers are still detectable, surprisingly short periods of observation are sufficient to make inferences about users' behaviour, and the characteristics of real behaviour allows for inferences even in secure system configurations.