Does additional information always reduce anonymity?
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Perfect Matching Disclosure Attacks
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Revisiting a combinatorial approach toward measuring anonymity
Proceedings of the 7th ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
The bayesian traffic analysis of mix networks
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Two-sided statistical disclosure attack
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Traffic analysis against low-latency anonymity networks using available bandwidth estimation
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
Relations among privacy notions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
WAR: wireless anonymous routing
Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Security Protocols
Understanding statistical disclosure: a least squares approach
PETS'12 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
You cannot hide for long: de-anonymization of real-world dynamic behaviour
Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society
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Anonymity services hide user identity at the network or address level but are vulnerable to attacks involving repeated observations of the user. Quantifying the number of observations required for an attack is a useful measure of anonymity.