The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
CRYPTO '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
New covert channels in HTTP: adding unwitting Web browsers to anonymity sets
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Minx: a simple and efficient anonymous packet format
Proceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Towards an information theoretic metric for anonymity
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
On anonymity in an electronic society: A survey of anonymous communication systems
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Membership-concealing overlay networks
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Two-sided statistical disclosure attack
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Cirripede: circumvention infrastructure using router redirection with plausible deniability
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
"Mix-in-Place" anonymous networking using secure function evaluation
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
An overview of anonymous communications in mobile ad hoc networks
Wireless Communications & Mobile Computing
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Oblivious submission to anonymity systems is a process by which a message may be submitted in such a way that neither the anonymity network nor a global passive adversary may determine that a valid message has been sent. We present Nonesuch: a mix network with steganographic submission and probabilistic identification and attenuation of cover traffic. In our system messages are submitted as stegotext hidden inside Usenet postings. The steganographic extraction mechanism is such that the the vast majority of the Usenet postings which do not contain keyed stegotext will produce meaningless output which serves as cover traffic, thus increasing the anonymity of the real messages. This cover traffic is subject to probabilistic attenuation in which nodes have only a small probability of distinguishing cover messages from "real" messages. This attenuation prevents cover traffic from travelling through the network in an infinite loop, while making it infeasible for an entrance node to distinguish senders.