STOC '91 Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
How to break the direct RSA-implementation of mixes
EUROCRYPT '89 Proceedings of the workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Efficient anonymous channel and all/nothing election scheme
EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
ISDN-MIXes: Untraceable Communication with Small Bandwidth Overhead
Kommunikation in Verteilten Systemen, Grundlagen, Anwendungen, Betrieb, GI/ITG-Fachtagung
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Hiding
From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types
IH '02 Revised Papers from the 5th International Workshop on Information Hiding
Two Practical and Provably Secure Block Ciphers: BEARS and LION
Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
SNDSS '96 Proceedings of the 1996 Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security (SNDSS '96)
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Dummy traffic against long term intersection attacks
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Provably secure public-key encryption for length-preserving chaumian mixes
CT-RSA'03 Proceedings of the 2003 RSA conference on The cryptographers' track
Synchronous batching: from cascades to free routes
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
The pynchon gate: a secure method of pseudonymous mail retrieval
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Nonesuch: a mix network with sender unobservability
Proceedings of the 5th ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Breaking and Provably Fixing Minx
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Private yet abuse resistant open publishing
Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Security protocols
Low latency anonymity with mix rings
ISC'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Information Security
Compulsion resistant anonymous communications
IH'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information Hiding
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Minx is a cryptographic message format for encoding anonymous messages, relayed through a network of Chaumian mixes. It provides security against a passive adversary by completely hiding correspondences between input and output messages. Possibly corrupt mixes on the message path gain no information about the route length or the position of the mix on the route. Most importantly Minx resists active attackers that are prepared to modify messages in order to embed tags which they will try to detect elsewhere in the network. The proposed scheme imposes a low communication and computational overhead, and only combines well understood cryptographic primitives.