Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Tarzan: a peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Introducing MorphMix: peer-to-peer based anonymous Internet usage with collusion detection
Proceedings of the 2002 ACM workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society
Chaffinch: Confidentiality in the Face of Legal Threats
IH '02 Revised Papers from the 5th International Workshop on Information Hiding
Probabilistic Analysis of Anonymity
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Minx: a simple and efficient anonymous packet format
Proceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Secret-Ballot Receipts: True Voter-Verifiable Elections
IEEE Security and Privacy
Towards an information theoretic metric for anonymity
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
A forward-secure public-key encryption scheme
EUROCRYPT'03 Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on Theory and applications of cryptographic techniques
How to Bypass Two Anonymity Revocation Schemes
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Selectively traceable anonymity
PET'06 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
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We study the effect compulsion attacks, through which an adversary can request a decryption or key from an honest node, have on the security of mix based anonymous communication systems. Some specific countermeasures are proposed that increase the cost of compulsion attacks, detect that tracing is taking place and ultimately allow for some anonymity to be preserved even when all nodes are under compulsion. Going beyond the case when a single message is traced, we also analyze the effect of multiple messages being traced and devise some techniques that could retain some anonymity. Our analysis highlights that we can reason about plausible deniability in terms of the information theoretic anonymity metrics.