Membership-concealing overlay networks

  • Authors:
  • Eugene Vasserman;Rob Jansen;James Tyra;Nicholas Hopper;Yongdae Kim

  • Affiliations:
  • University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA;University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA;University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA;University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA;University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

We introduce the concept of membership-concealing overlay networks (MCONs), which hide the real-world identities of participants. We argue that while membership concealment is orthogonal to anonymity and censorship resistance, pseudonymous communication and censorship resistance become much easier if done over a membership-concealing network. We formalize the concept of membership concealment, discuss a number of attacks against existing systems and present real-world attack results. We then propose three proof-of-concept MCON designs that resist those attacks: one that is more efficient, another that is more robust to membership churn, and a third that balances efficiency and robustness. We show theoretical and simulation results demonstrating the feasibility and performance of our schemes.