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ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
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Proportional differentiated services: delay differentiation and packet scheduling
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IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
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ACM SIGMOBILE Mobile Computing and Communications Review
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TREC '98 Proceedings of the International IFIP/GI Working Conference on Trends in Distributed Systems for Electronic Commerce
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
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CRYPTO '00 Proceedings of the 20th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '88 Proceedings of the 8th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
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WELCOM '01 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Electronic Commerce
PayWord and MicroMint: Two Simple Micropayment Schemes
Proceedings of the International Workshop on Security Protocols
Traffic Analysis Attacks and Trade-Offs in Anonymity Providing Systems
IHW '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Information Hiding
The Eigentrust algorithm for reputation management in P2P networks
WWW '03 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on World Wide Web
PeerTrust: Supporting Reputation-Based Trust for Peer-to-Peer Electronic Communities
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering
Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
PowerTrust: A Robust and Scalable Reputation System for Trusted Peer-to-Peer Computing
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
Combating Double-Spending Using Cooperative P2P Systems
ICDCS '07 Proceedings of the 27th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
How much anonymity does network latency leak?
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Shining Light in Dark Places: Understanding the Tor Network
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
PAR: Payment for Anonymous Routing
PETS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Don't Clog the Queue! Circuit Clogging and Mitigation in P2P Anonymity Schemes
Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Scrivener: providing incentives in cooperative content distribution systems
Proceedings of the ACM/IFIP/USENIX 2005 International Conference on Middleware
Membership-concealing overlay networks
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Scalable onion routing with torsk
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XPay: practical anonymous payments for tor routing and other networked services
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Ripping coins for a fair exchange
EUROCRYPT'95 Proceedings of the 14th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Towards an information theoretic metric for anonymity
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
A practical congestion attack on tor using long paths
SSYM'09 Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
Improving tor using a TCP-over-DTLS tunnel
SSYM'09 Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
Building reliable mix networks with fair exchange
ACNS'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
FC'10 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
A case for relative differentiated services and the proportional differentiation model
IEEE Network: The Magazine of Global Internetworking
ExperimenTor: a testbed for safe and realistic tor experimentation
CSET'11 Proceedings of the 4th conference on Cyber security experimentation and test
DefenestraTor: throwing out windows in Tor
PETS'11 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
A game-theoretic analysis of cooperation in anonymity networks
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Throttling Tor bandwidth parasites
Security'12 Proceedings of the 21st USENIX conference on Security symposium
Methodically modeling the Tor network
CSET'12 Proceedings of the 5th USENIX conference on Cyber Security Experimentation and Test
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Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
PCTCP: per-circuit TCP-over-IPsec transport for anonymous communication overlay networks
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
The design and implementation of the A3 application-aware anonymity platform
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
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Tor, a distributed Internet anonymizing system, relies on volunteers who run dedicated relays. Other than altruism, these volunteers have no incentive to run relays, causing a large disparity between the number of users and available relays. We introduce BRAIDS, a set of practical mechanisms that encourages users to run Tor relays, allowing them to earn credits redeemable for improved performance of both interactive and non-interactive Tor traffic. These performance incentives will allow Tor to support increasing resource demands with almost no loss in anonymity: BRAIDS is robust to well-known attacks. Using a simulation of 20,300 Tor nodes, we show that BRAIDS allows relays to achieve 75% lower latency than non-relays for interactive traffic, and 90% higher bandwidth utilization for non-interactive traffic.