King: estimating latency between arbitrary internet end hosts
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
On the risks of serving whenever you surf: vulnerabilities in Tor's blocking resistance design
Proceedings of the 8th ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Recruiting new tor relays with BRAIDS
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
An improved algorithm for tor circuit scheduling
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
On the secrecy of spread-spectrum flow watermarks
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
Traffic analysis against low-latency anonymity networks using available bandwidth estimation
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
Empirical tests of anonymous voice over IP
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
ExperimenTor: a testbed for safe and realistic tor experimentation
CSET'11 Proceedings of the 4th conference on Cyber security experimentation and test
DefenestraTor: throwing out windows in Tor
PETS'11 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Throttling Tor bandwidth parasites
Security'12 Proceedings of the 21st USENIX conference on Security symposium
Torchestra: reducing interactive traffic delays over tor
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
An Approach to Data Confidentiality Protection in Cloud Environments
International Journal of Web Services Research
How (not) to build a transport layer for anonymity overlays
ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
PCTCP: per-circuit TCP-over-IPsec transport for anonymous communication overlay networks
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
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The Tor network gives anonymity to Internet users by relaying their traffic through the world over a variety of routers. All traffic between any pair of routers, even if they represent circuits for different clients, are multiplexed over a single TCP connection. This results in interference across circuits during congestion control, packet dropping and packet reordering. This interference greatly contributes to Tor's notorious latency problems. Our solution is to use a TCP-over-DTLS (Datagram Transport Layer Security) transport between routers. We give each stream of data its own TCP connection, and protect the TCP headers--which would otherwise give stream identification information to an attacker--with DTLS. We perform experiments on our implemented version to illustrate that our proposal has indeed resolved the cross-circuit interference.