Traffic Analysis Attacks and Trade-Offs in Anonymity Providing Systems
IHW '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Information Hiding
Defending Anonymous Communications Against Passive Logging Attacks
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
PlanetLab: an overlay testbed for broad-coverage services
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Low-resource routing attacks against tor
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Denial of service or denial of security?
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
ConceptDoppler: a weather tracker for internet censorship
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering (Information Revolution and Global Politics)
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Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Sampled traffic analysis by internet-exchange-level adversaries
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Improving tor using a TCP-over-DTLS tunnel
SSYM'09 Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
Practical traffic analysis: extending and resisting statistical disclosure
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
BridgeSPA: improving Tor bridges with single packet authorization
Proceedings of the 10th annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Cirripede: circumvention infrastructure using router redirection with plausible deniability
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
FC'10 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Beyond TOR: the truenyms protocol
SIIS'11 Proceedings of the 2011 international conference on Security and Intelligent Information Systems
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PETS'12 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
SkypeMorph: protocol obfuscation for Tor bridges
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
StegoTorus: a camouflage proxy for the Tor anonymity system
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
CensorSpoofer: asymmetric communication using IP spoofing for censorship-resistant web browsing
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Cover your ACKs: pitfalls of covert channel censorship circumvention
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
Message in a bottle: sailing past censorship
Proceedings of the 29th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
How to block Tor's hidden bridges: detecting methods and countermeasures
The Journal of Supercomputing
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In Tor, a bridge is a client node that volunteers to help censored users access Tor by serving as an unlisted, first-hop relay. Since bridging is voluntary, the success of this circumvention mechanism depends critically on the willingness of clients to act as bridges. We identify three key architectural shortcomings of the bridge design: (1) bridges are easy to find; (2) a bridge always accepts connections when its operator is using Tor; and (3) traffic to and from clients connected to a bridge interferes with traffic to and from the bridge operator. These shortcomings lead to an attack that can expose the IP address of bridge operators visiting certain web sites over Tor. We also discuss mitigation mechanisms.