Freenet: a distributed anonymous information storage and retrieval system
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
Tangler: a censorship-resistant publishing system based on document entanglements
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Infranet: Circumventing Web Censorship and Surveillance
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Publius: a robust, tamper-evident, censorship-resistant web publishing system
SSYM'00 Proceedings of the 9th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 9
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Low-resource routing attacks against tor
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
A web based covert file system
HOTOS'07 Proceedings of the 11th USENIX workshop on Hot topics in operating systems
Asymptotically optimal perfect steganographic systems
Problems of Information Transmission
Fisher Information Determines Capacity of ε-Secure Steganography
Information Hiding
Remote timing attacks are practical
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking - Web security
On the risks of serving whenever you surf: vulnerabilities in Tor's blocking resistance design
Proceedings of the 8th ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Fingerprinting websites using traffic analysis
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Steganalysis by subtractive pixel adjacency matrix
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
A practical congestion attack on tor using long paths
SSYM'09 Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
Advanced Statistical Steganalysis
Advanced Statistical Steganalysis
Gibbs construction in steganography
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Chipping away at censorship firewalls with user-generated content
USENIX Security'10 Proceedings of the 19th USENIX conference on Security
Telex: anticensorship in the network infrastructure
SEC'11 Proceedings of the 20th USENIX conference on Security
"Break our steganographic system": the ins and outs of organizing BOSS
IH'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Information hiding
Perfectly Secure Steganography: Capacity, Error Exponents, and Code Constructions
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Hummingbird: Privacy at the Time of Twitter
SP '12 Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
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Exploiting recent advances in monitoring technology and the drop of its costs, authoritarian and oppressive regimes are tightening the grip around the virtual lives of their citizens. Meanwhile, the dissidents, oppressed by these regimes, are organizing online, cloaking their activity with anti-censorship systems that typically consist of a network of anonymizing proxies. The censors have become well aware of this, and they are systematically finding and blocking all the entry points to these networks. So far, they have been quite successful. We believe that, to achieve resilience to blocking, anti-censorship systems must abandon the idea of having a limited number of entry points. Instead, they should establish first contact in an online location arbitrarily chosen by each of their users. To explore this idea, we have developed Message In A Bottle, a protocol where any blog post becomes a potential "drop point" for hidden messages. We have developed and released a proof-of-concept application of our system, and demonstrated its feasibility. To block this system, censors are left with a needle-in-a-haystack problem: Unable to identify what bears hidden messages, they must block everything, effectively disconnecting their own network from a large part of the Internet. This, hopefully, is a cost too high to bear.