Remote timing attacks are practical

  • Authors:
  • David Brumley;Dan Boneh

  • Affiliations:
  • Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Ave, Wean Hall # 8116, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA;Computer Science Department, Stanford University, Gates 475, Stanford, CA 94305, USA

  • Venue:
  • Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking - Web security
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

Timing attacks are usually used to attack weak computing devices such as smartcards. We show that timing attacks apply to general software systems. Specifically, we devise a timing attack against OpenSSL. Our experiments show that we can extract private keys from an OpenSSL-based web server running on a machine in the local network. Our results demonstrate that timing attacks against network servers are practical and therefore security systems should defend against them.