Proceedings of the 27th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
A note on the confinement problem
Communications of the ACM
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Power Analysis Attacks of Modular Exponentiation in Smartcards
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Resistance against Differential Power Analysis for Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
CHES '99 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Smartly Analyzing the Simplicity and the Power of Simple Power Analysis on Smartcards
CHES '00 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Probabilistic Noninterference for Multi-Threaded Programs
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
On Confidentiality and Algorithms
SP '01 Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Writing Temporally Predictable Code
WORDS '02 Proceedings of the The Seventh IEEE International Workshop on Object-Oriented Real-Time Dependable Systems (WORDS 2002)
Low-Cost Solutions for Preventing Simple Side-Channel Analysis: Side-Channel Atomicity
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Secure Information Flow by Self-Composition
CSFW '04 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Downgrading policies and relaxed noninterference
Proceedings of the 32nd ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Dimensions and Principles of Declassification
CSFW '05 Proceedings of the 18th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Quantifying Timing Leaks and Cost Optimisation
ICICS '08 Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Information and Communications Security
Remote timing attacks are practical
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking - Web security
Timing Aware Information Flow Security for a JavaCard-like Bytecode
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Software verification with BLAST
SPIN'03 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Model checking software
Timed abstract non-interference
FORMATS'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Formal Modeling and Analysis of Timed Systems
Secure information flow as a safety problem
SAS'05 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Static Analysis
Timing-sensitive information flow analysis for synchronous systems
ESORICS'06 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Eliminating implicit information leaks by transformational typing and unification
FAST'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
Counterexample driven refinement for abstract interpretation
TACAS'06 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems
ICISC'05 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
Language-based information-flow security
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Formal verification of side-channel countermeasures using self-composition
Science of Computer Programming
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Side channel attacks have emerged as a serious threat to the security of both networked and embedded systems – in particular through the implementations of cryptographic operations. Side channels can be difficult to model formally, but with careful coding and program transformation techniques it may be possible to verify security in the presence of specific side-channel attacks. But what if a program intentionally makes a tradeoff between security and efficiency and leaks some information through a side channel? In this paper we study such tradeoffs using ideas from recent research on declassification. We present a semantic model of security for programs which allow for declassification through side channels, and show how side-channel declassification can be verified using off-the-shelf software model checking tools. Finally, to make it simpler for verifiers to check that a program conforms to a particular side-channel declassification policy we introduce a further tradeoff between efficiency and verifiability: by writing programs in a particular “manifest form” security becomes considerably easier to verify.