CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Low Cost Attacks on Tamper Resistant Devices
Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Security Protocols
Design principles for tamper-resistant smartcard processors
WOST'99 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology on USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology
Investigations of power analysis attacks on smartcards
WOST'99 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology on USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology
Tamper resistance: a cautionary note
WOEC'96 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Proceedings of the Second USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 2
Sliding Windows Succumbs to Big Mac Attack
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Randomized Addition-Subtraction Chains as a Countermeasure against Power Attacks
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
A DPA Attack against the Modular Reduction within a CRT Implementation of RSA
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
A First-Order DPA Attack Against AES in Counter Mode with Unknown Initial Counter
CHES '07 Proceedings of the 9th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
You Cannot Hide behind the Mask: Power Analysis on a Provably Secure S-Box Implementation
Information Security Applications
Mutual information analysis under the view of higher-order statistics
IWSEC'10 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Advances in information and computer security
Extended cubes: enhancing the cube attack by extracting low-degree non-linear equations
Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
Design and characterisation of an AES chip embedding countermeasures
International Journal of Intelligent Engineering Informatics
FSE'05 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Fast Software Encryption
Optically enhanced position-locked power analysis
CHES'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
A proposition for correlation power analysis enhancement
CHES'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
On highly nonlinear s-boxes and their inability to thwart DPA attacks
INDOCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Cryptology in India
Specification and verification of side channel declassification
FAST'09 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
On the security bounds of CMC, EME, EME+ and EME* modes of operation
ICICS'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information and Communications Security
Correlation power analysis of Trivium
Security and Communication Networks
Randomized Instruction Injection to Counter Power Analysis Attacks
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems (TECS)
A model of DPA syndrome and its application to the identification of leaking gates
PATMOS'07 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Integrated Circuit and System Design: power and timing modeling, optimization and simulation
Controversy Corner: Efficient Hamming weight-based side-channel cube attacks on PRESENT
Journal of Systems and Software
Implementation of correlation power analysis attack on an FPGA DES design
International Journal of Information and Communication Technology
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A new kind of cryptanalytic attacks, targeted directly at the weaknesses of a cryptographic algorithm's physical implementation, has recently attracted great attention. Examples are timing, glitch, or poweranalysis attacks. Whereas in so-called simple power analysis (SPA for short) only the power consumption of the device is analyzed, differential power analysis (DPA) additionally requires knowledge of ciphertext outputs and is thus more costly. Previous investigations have indicated that SPA is little threatening and moreover easy to prevent, leaving only DPA as a serious menace to smartcard integrity. We show, however, that with careful experimental technique, SPA allows for extracting sensitive information easily, requiring only a single power-consumption graph. This even holds with respect to basic instructions such as register moves, which have previously not been considered critical. Our results suggest that SPA is an effective and easily implementable attack and, due to its simplicity, potentially a more serious threat than DPA in many real applications.