Design principles for tamper-resistant smartcard processors

  • Authors:
  • Oliver Kömmerling;Markus G. Kuhn

  • Affiliations:
  • Advanced Digital Security Research, Riedelberg, Germany;University of Cambridge, Computer Laboratory, Cambridge, United Kingdom

  • Venue:
  • WOST'99 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology on USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology
  • Year:
  • 1999

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Abstract

We describe techniques for extracting protected software and data from smartcard processors. This includes manual microprobing, laser cutting, focused ion-beam manipulation, glitch attacks, and power analysis. Many of these methods have already been used to compromise widely-fielded conditional-access systems, and current smartcards offer little protection against them. We give examples of low-cost protection concepts that make such attacks considerably more difficult.